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Introduction1 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of media and journalists in uncovering of corruption 
cases in Hungary. How does the Hungarian media deal with corruption cases and how do the 
structure of political polarization and ownership structure of Hungarian media influence this special 
activity of journalists? 
The paper consists of two parts describing the relation between the corruption and media in 
Hungary from two perspectives. In the first section we present four particular Hungarian corruption 
cases by briefly describing their background and analysing thoroughly the role of media in the 
outbreak of these scandals. The cases were selected in order to be able to explain the function of the 
Hungarian press, especially its investigative departments. 
The second part of the study focuses on the general nature of the Hungarian press with 
special emphasis on investigative journalism. The aim of this chapter is to provide insights into the 
Hungarian media market and its influencing factors. The cases of the first section are often quoted 
to make the findings more illustrative. At the end of the paper we summarize the main lessons from 
this analysis. 
The study is based on eight semi-structured interviews2 with leading investigative journalists 
and one with a media expert in Hungary. The results of the fieldwork were processed anonymously; 
the conversations were not recorded. We subsequently analysed the articles and documents using 
the Google and other applications and databases3 related to the topic. The findings related to people, 
organizations or news outlets that are based on publicly available sources are indicated in the 
footnotes.  
                                                
1 We would like to thank Katalin Goldstein (Corvinus University Budapest) and Samuel Markson (Harvard University) 
for proofreading the study. 
2 Some more details of the interviews are presented in the second part of the appendix. 
3 For instance, www.textplore.org (a software for content analysis with a database containing about three million 
articles) and www.kmonitor.hu (a database of articles from the online media dealing with corruption, public 
procurement, public spending and, in general, with the transparency of the public sphere). 
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The representation of specific corruption cases in the Hungarian 
media 
 
 
 
 
1. Investigation with severe political effects: the Tocsik scandal 
 
Relevance 
The Tocsik case is considered to be the first important corruption scandal since the transition in 
1989-90. It is still not known exactly who leaked the information about the scandal, but the 
intelligence agencies and the different interest groups are supposed to be the sources of the initial 
data. The journalists had positive roles in the outbreak of the scandal, which can be considered both 
active (enforcer or initiator) and passive (reporter or facilitator). The Tocsik case had serious 
political affects too. 
 
Background 
In 1996, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Hungary filed a civil lawsuit on suspicion of fraud 
against Márta Tocsik, a lawyer, which was followed by a prosecution procedure a year later. For her 
involvement in the formalization of contracts of the National Privatization and Asset Management 
Corporation4 (later: NPAM) involving local government’s land affairs, she received an 804 million 
HUF (5.3 million USD5) commission. During a long series of judicial proceedings lasting 12 years, 
many contradictory verdicts have been made6. Márta Tocsik was clearly only one of the actors, a 
scapegoat in a complex and iconic case of political corruption. One of the journalists who exposed 
the scandal wrote a eulogy for Márta Tocsik’s death concluding that she was in the wrong place at 
the wrong time and her life was ruined because of a scandal in which she was supposed to be only a 
puppet.7 The Tocsik case was closely followed by the media and was used as a political tool to gain 
political capital. 
In Hungary the act XIII8 of 1989 stated that the value of the lands of public companies has to be 
transferred to the local governments, as forming strong local governments was an important guiding 
                                                
4 Állami Privatizációs és Vagyonkezelő Rt. (ÁPV Rt.) 
5 Calculation is based on the average exchange rates in 1996 (source: www.mtieco.hu) 
6 http://k-monitor.hu/adatbazis/aktak/tocsik-ugy 
7 http://www.komment.hu/tartalom/20130417-meghalt-tocsik-marta-1.html  
8 Hungarian laws are numbered in Roman numerals. 
 5 
principle during the transition in 1989-90. Due to a controversial interpretation of this law, the 
center-right Antall-government9 (in office from 1990 to 1993) delayed its implementation and the 
NPAM could take advantage of determining the value of the local government’s interests10. The act 
LIV of 1992, a retroactive regulation, decreased the amounts belonging to the municipalities. Local 
governments protested against the ruling by bringing hundreds of lawsuits against the state. During 
the era of socialist-liberal government – the coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party (later: HSP) 
and the Alliance of Free Democrats –, the Supreme Court set a precedent in the city of 
Dunaújváros, making the Dunaferr Company11 pay the sum of the initial claim for the local 
government. 
The first actors of the Tocsik-case were the Vektor ltd. and the Vektor Broker ltd (see Figure 1.). 
These companies offered brokering deals between local governments and the NPAM for a 
performance fee of ten percent for the mayors.12 One of their managers mentioned later in the press 
was Péter Lovas.13 On the 9th of December 1995, Imre Szokai, president of the NPAM and 
confidant of the current Prime Minister (Gyula Horn, HSP), introduced Márta Tocsik to Péter 
Liszkai, counsellor of NPAM. Five days later, Péter Liszkai (NPAM) and Péter Lovas (Vektor) 
finally reached an extrajudicial agreement about the sums that were entitled to the represented local 
governments. Liszkai named Tocsik as a mediator (for a ten percent commission), whose task was 
also cost minimizing for NPAM during the negotiation process. The appointment and payment of 
Tocsik was a result of a case of corruption involving multiple actors. The role of the Supervisory 
Board of NPAM was unclear but they did not prevent the deal and the employment of Tocsik by the 
Directory Board. Also, Tocsik was the only applicant of the two-day long application process for 
the position. Three kinds of problems surrounded this application process: 
 
  
                                                
9 http://www.britannica.com/biography/Jozsef-Antall  
10 http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a_szokai-tocsik-ugy_x-aktak-61137  
11  The Dunaferr Danube Ironworks is one of the most significant industrial producers in Hungary 
(http://www.dunaferr.hu/en/) 
12 http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/a-tocsik-botrany 
13 http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a_szokai-tocsik-ugy_x-aktak-61137 
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Figure 1: The actors and mechanism of the Tocsik’s case 
 
         Notes: NPAM: National Privatization and Asset Management Corporation 
 M. Tocsik: Maria Tocsik, lawyer 
     : local governments brought hundreds of lawsuits against the NPAM 
   : corrupt transaction (outsourcing of mediation to Marta Tocsik  
     without competition with high level of commission) 
      : transfer of bribes 
 HSP     : companies owned by leaders of Hungarian Socialist Party 
 AFD    : companies owned by leaders of Alliance of Free Democrats 
 Vector : Vektor ltd. and the Vektor Broker ltd, private owned companies 
         : legal market transactions: Vector companies offered brokering deals  
         between local governments and NPAM (via M. Tocsik) for a  
         performance fee 
       : local governments (in different colour) 
 
 
1. Marta Tocsik established a monopoly position that allowed her frent-seeking, 
2. the selection process of Marta Tocsik was not transparent but it was uncompetitive (she was 
the only applicant), 
3. Marta Tocsik later transferred a high portion of her performance fee to firms related to the 
ruling parties (HSP and AFD)14. 
                                                
14 It clearly appears that M. Tocsik played a role of ’broker’ or ’middleman’ between the corrupted leaders of NPAM 
(bribers) and the leaders of ruling parties (HSP and ADF). See: Della Porta, D. – Vanucci, A. (2012): The Hidden Order 
of Corruption. An Institutional Approach, Ashgate, Farnham, England, pp. 135-171. and Szántó, Z. – Tóth, I. J. – Varga, 
S. (2012): The social and institutional structure of corruption: some typical network configurations of corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     NPAM                   M. Tocsik         Vector 
        (with leaders from 
 HSP and AFD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                HSP       AFD 
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An internal investigation aiming to uncover the aforementioned payments was suspended15. In total, 
the two Vector companies realized a 2 billion HUF profit (13.1 million USD16) and Márta Tocsik 
earned a total of 804 million HUF17. Tocsik transferred a large percentage of the payment to various 
private-owned companies close to the socialist and liberal parties which formed the government and 
individuals such as her secretary or even a cabdriver18. Tocsik’s (eventually retracted) confession 
revealed that László Boldvai (treasurer of the Socialist Party at that time) and György Budai (an 
entrepreneur associated with the Alliance of Free Democrats, AFD) extorted money from her for 
the companies (Arány ltd. and Utilitas ltd.)19. 
The scandal emerged on the 18th of September 1996, when Figyelő20, a Hungarian weekly paper, 
published an article about NPAM trying to deal with local governments by hiring an external 
specialist21. On the 24th of September, Tamás Deutsch (member of the FIDESZ, an opposition party 
at that time) drew attention to the article in the Hungarian Parliament. Following a long chain of 
events, the government suspended the members of the NPAM directory board. On October 6, the 
Prime Minister dismissed Tamás Suchman (HSP member), the minister responsible for matters of 
privatization from his position. On October 8, the Prosecutor General’s Office ordered an 
investigation against Tocsik for forgery of official documents and against an unknown suspect in 
the NPAM leadership. In the Parliament, a parliamentary committee headed by Tamás Deutsch was 
established to investigate the Tocsik case. One of our interviewees stated that the board of the 
NPAM led by Imre Szokai, and the board of the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), led by Iván 
Pető, knew about the money transfers between Márta Tocsik and the aforementioned companies. 
The legal proceeding at first instance started on the 27th of November 1997 at the Budapest 
Metropolitan Court. In 1999, the Court dropped all charges due to absence of crime in the case of 
Tocsik, Liszkai and Szokai, while determining abuse of influence by Boldvai and Budai. In 2000, 
the Supreme Court relaunched the procedure. In 2002, Tocsik was found guilty of abetment in 
embezzlement, was sentenced to 4 years in prison and was ordered to pay back a total of 640 
million HUF. Liszkai and Szokai were imprisoned and all charges were dropped against Boldvai 
and Budai. In April 2003, the charges were dropped against Tocsik, but she was fined 400.000 HUF 
for forgery by the Supreme Court.22 In 2008, she lost the civil trial and she had to pay back 562 
                                                                                                                                                            
transactions in Hungary, In: Vedres, B. – Scotti, M. (eds.): Network sin Social Policy Problems, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK. pp. 156-176. 
15 http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a_szokai-tocsik-ugy_x-aktak-61137 
16 Calculation is based on the average exchange rates in 1996 (source: www.mtieco.hu) 
17 http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/a-tocsik-botrany  
18 http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a_szokai-tocsik-ugy_x-aktak-61137 
19 http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/a-tocsik-botrany 
20 Literal translation of the title of the newspaper: Observer 
21 http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a_szokai-tocsik-ugy_x-aktak-61137 
22 http://budapesttimes.hu/2013/09/28/then-and-now-the-tocsik-case/  
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million HUF as a result. She wasn’t present at the trial due to her illness. She died in 201323, at the 
age of 61. 
The HVG online news portal mentions that the Tocsik case helped FIDESZ to emerge as the most 
popular right-wing party. With the Tocsik case, FIDESZ received much of the media’s attention 
and gained popularity24. Also the Alliance of Free Democrats suffered heavy losses, the number of 
its supporters dropped in 1996; the proportion of the supporters of the Alliance of Free Democrats 
was fluctuating between 15 and 20 per cents in 1995, and it decreased to about 10 per cents after the 
eruption of Tocsik-case25. 
 
The role of the media in the Tocsik case 
As the scandal erupted, the first details of the case were revealed by the editor and a journalist of 
Figyelő, Tibor Krecz and Zoltán Siposs2627. Initially the journalists were be considered as passive, 
positive – reporter or facilitator - actors in the Tocsik case, but that role became more active 
(enforcer or initiator). The documents – half-page summaries of the board decisions of NPAM28 – 
supporting the story were hidden in a brown envelope left in a locker of the Budapest Keleti railway 
station29. The key of the locker was put under a traffic sign next to a gas station on the M3 
motorway near Budapest. However, the authors never talked to anyone about how did they came to 
know the existence of these documents, they only claimed that the source was not Tibor Krecz’s 
wife, who worked at the legal department of the NPAM at that time. 
The interests regarding the outbreak of the scandal remained unclear too. Zoltán Siposs suggested in 
his memoir written on the occasion of Marta Tocsik’s death that one interest group wanted a too big 
share of the privatization and others became unhappy with that situation30. Nevertheless, we can 
conclude based on interviews that the motivation of the journalists of Figyelő of writing the story 
derived from naivety. They acted instinctively and tried to do their job faithfully after they received 
the information about the case but they did not recognize the importance of the story. However, we 
should note that Világgazdaság, a daily newspaper, also possessed the information about the 
Tocsik-case. 
The two journalists, Krecz and Siposs thought that their article would be immediately forgotten. But 
soon they were threatened and intercepted, the door of their editorial office was cracked and their 
                                                
23 http://index.hu/belfold/2013/04/17/meghalt_tocsik_marta/ 
24 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130417_Meghalt_Tocsik_Marta 
25 http://www.tarsadalomkutatas.hu/kkk.php?TPUBL-A-931/publikaciok/tpubl_a_931.pdf  
26 http://fn.hir24.hu/itthon/2005/09/21/1996_tocsik_ugy_nyitanya/  
27 http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1996/09/18/rendk_v_li_kiad/  
28 http://cink.hu/mi-is-volt-az-a-tocsik-ugy-es-hogyan-leplezodott-le-474749417  
29 http://www.komment.hu/tartalom/20130417-meghalt-tocsik-marta-1.html  
30 http://www.komment.hu/tartalom/20130417-meghalt-tocsik-marta-1.html  
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telephone directory was stolen by the Hungarian intelligence agencies led by István Nikolics 
(Minister of Civilian Intelligence Services). Tibor Krecz’s wife was immediately fired from the 
NPAM, and a family feud emerged too due to the publication of the story31. Nearly twenty years 
after the first article appeared about Tocsik case, the authors still refuse to share details about their 
sources of information, and they are not keen on talking about the scandal. 
Világgazdaság, the newspaper that also possessed the information about the activity of Tocsik, for 
unknown reasons just published them a day later than Figyelő – however as Világgazdaság was a 
daily newspaper, probably it could probably publish the story earlier, than Figyelő. Additionally, 
several journalists of other newspapers and magazines gained some information about the case, but 
they chose not to publish it. Krecz and Siposs also involved some of their colleagues for two 
reasons: on the one hand to show them that their statements are legitimate and on the other hand to 
have company in case of political retaliation. Even the editors of significant newspapers, like 
Magyar Hírlap, received the documents from Krecz.32 
The first article – its title was the “Saver I.” – of Figyelő revealed only the initials of Marta Tocsik, 
her full name was not published, as the system of the corruption was more important than her 
personality. Krecz and Siposs tried to interview “M. T.”, but she ignored their request citing her 
illness33. The article’s main statement was that an external advisor could earn 600 million forints in 
one year from the Hungarian state and is conferred with full powers to negotiate with local 
governments by the NPAM since January 1996, however the staff of NPAM was supposed to do 
this job. Another key fact was also revealed, that the NPAM violated its internal rules when Marta 
Tocsik was chosen to manage the negotiations, and political aspects were considered during the 
selection; however, the NPAM’s managers pretended that a professional company had been ordered 
to do the work that was delegated to Marta Tocsik with an article published on the 13th August 1996 
in the official journal of NPAM (Heti Privinfo). The authors referred to the documents justifying 
the scandal, however they did not mention their sources or any details of them. Moreover, they 
shortly interviewed Tamás Lovas, the director of Vektor (and the brother of Péter Lovas), and an 
affected mayor. Tamás Lovas said that more than a hundred local governments were involved into 
the negotiations, but he denied discussing the claimed amounts, the commissions and the 
circumstances of money transfers, however he declared that there is no legal relationship between 
Vektor and Marta Tocsik. 
                                                
31 http://cink.hu/tenyleg-a-felesege-szivarogtatta-ki-a-papirokat-exkl-474750779  
32 http://cink.hu/mi-is-volt-az-a-tocsik-ugy-es-hogyan-leplezodott-le-474749417  
33 http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1996/09/18/rendk_v_li_kiad/ 
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A week later Figyelő revealed some more details in its second article (Saver II.) about the scandal.34 
It claimed that Marta Tocsik could have earned roughly 800 million forints instead of the previously 
mentioned 600 million forints, though her full name was dissembled again. The article cited several 
other newspapers (Magyar Hírlap35, Népszabadság36, Világgazdaság37) that published the NPAM’s 
statements about the circumstances of choosing and hiring the external advisor after the Figyelő’s 
first article. Figyelő also noted that these official statements did not match with the information 
included in their documents regarding the scandal. 
The portrait of Marta Tocsik was hidden for a long time; the first interview with a photo of her was 
published on the front page of a newspaper called Népszava38 (close to left-wing parties) only 
several weeks after the outbreak of the scandal.39 Meanwhile journalists had tracked down her 
address, had taken photos and videos of the house where she lived, and presented Tocsik’s home as 
a luxury fortress. They had even tried to gather information from her neighbours. A tabloid named 
Mai Nap had published a sketch of her face. 
When the third article40 (Saver III.) about the Tocsik-case of Figyelő, on the 2nd October 1996 was 
published, the full name of Marta Tocsik was already known. Based on the exclusive information of 
Figyelő, the article revealed that in 1989-90, several proceedings were conducted against Marta 
Tocsik on account of document forgery and embezzlement, but in the end she was not punished. 
The journalists were able to conduct an interview with her, and she said that she was not personally 
working for NPAM, but her financial and legal agency did the work with subcontractors. The article 
also revealed a contradiction regarding the number of affected municipalities between the 
statements of Tamás Suchmann and the information of Figyelő. 
On the 9th October 1996 Figyelő published only a paragraph41 (Saver IV.) about the political and 
legal proceedings started after the scandal had been unleashed, concluding that the first act of the 
Tocsik-case was finished. From then on the press started to report about these procedures. Based on 
its background information Figyelő formulated jugdements about them (Saver V.)42 on the 30th 
October 1996. It also revealed some more information about circumstances of the beginning of the 
cooperation between the NPAM, the Vektor and Marta Tocsik, recalling the suspicion that Imre 
Szokai pushed her to be the external advisor. 
                                                
34 http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1996/09/25/indokolatlan_kiad_pv/  
35 Literal translation of the title of the newspaper: Hungarian Newspaper 
36 Literal translation of the title of the newspaper: People’s Freedom 
37 Literal translation of the title of the newspaper: World Economy 
38 Literal translation of the title of the newspaper: People’s Word 
39 http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/a-tocsik-botrany 
40 http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1996/10/02/indokolatlan_kiad_pv/  
41 http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1996/10/09/megtakar_t_iv/  
42 http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1996/10/30/pv_rt_botr/   
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The role of the press changed over the course of the Tocsik-case proceedings. As the journalists 
began to gather more and more information and data about the case, they became active rather than 
passive participants. They began to find out the details of the case and personal information about 
Marta Tocsik. 
The Hungarian public service television also broadcasted a report about the Tocsik case soon after 
Figyelő had published the first article in a news show, called Objektív. The director of Vektor was 
also interviewed in the show, and the transactions between Marta Tocsik and the Arány and Utilitas 
companies were uncovered in the Objektív on the 15th October 1996. The presenter and news editor 
was András Bánó, who had several affairs with the governments and his superiors because of the 
independent tone of his previous television programmes.43 In the end of 1996 the president of the 
public service television put an end to Objektív. Bánó suggested, that because of their commentary 
about the Tocsik case, Objektív fell out of favour with the socialist-liberal government, ultimately 
leading its annulment. This was also confirmed by one of our interviewees. However the 
government did not really care about Figyelő after the report of Objektív had been broadcasted.44 
Figyelő published one more report45 about the proceedings of the Tocsik-case in its series of articles 
(Saver VI.) at the end of January. As the investigation had started, several contracts, money transfer 
receipts and other documents came into the possession of the authorities, and the press could be 
informed from official sources. The involvement of the Alliance of Free Democrats and the 
Hungarian Socialist Party was also known by this time. Later the media reported on the progress of 
the lawsuits of the Tocsik-case. 
During the interviews with journalists and media experts it turned out that some journalists – and 
their children – were threatened in connection with the Tocsik-case. Also some informers who were 
in high administrative positions who had promised to help the journalists, finally refused to support 
them due to the riskiness of Tocsik-case. In addition, Marta Tocsik personally tried to persuade 
journalists not to write about the scandal. But even if some news outlets initially supported her, they 
finally published articles about the Tocsik-case too. 
 
Conclusions 
The Tocsik-case was the first Hungarian corruption scandal after the 1989-90 transition that had 
serious political effects. It also set precedent in Hungary through the work of the editors and 
journalists of Figyelő, who did not expect that their first article about the case would have such an 
impact. However, the details of the eruption of the scandal are becoming more and more forgotten. 
                                                
43 See: http://bit.ly/1XLyjsO  
44 http://cink.hu/tenyleg-a-felesege-szivarogtatta-ki-a-papirokat-exkl-474750779  
45 http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1997/01/22/pv_rt_szokai_gy/  
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The interviewed journalists and media specialists could hardly recall the specifics of the media’s 
role in the Tocsik-case once nearly 20 years had passed. 
The journalists and experts who were interviewed agreed that the Tocsik-case attracted a lot of 
interest because of the following reasons: 
1) The concept of performance fee was easy to understand for many people, even if some other 
aspects of the case was much more complicated. 
2) The Bokros package46, a series of austerity measures was announced in 1995. 
3) As the amount of money involved in the scandal was not as large as in other corruption 
cases, it was easy to understand – millions are recognisable but billions are not for the 
general public,  
4) the Alliance of Free Democrats was not part of major scandals before the Tocsik-case, 
5) it was one of the first cases of corruption revealed in the media after the transition in 1989-
90 and such cases were new for the public. 
In addition, the interviewees highlighted that in the 1990’s the weekly papers and television 
channels were in an oligopolistic situation and the publicity was not polarized between the political 
sides like at that time47. Furthermore, they emphasized that it was easy to get lost in the details of 
the Tocsik-case. As a result, the role of Imre Szokai and György Budai was not well understood by 
the public. 
After the Tocsik-case had erupted, a new explanation emerged for why did two previously 
conflicting party formed a coalition, even if one of them, the Hungarian Socialist Party could form a 
government individually: money. The popularity of the Alliance of Free Democrats started to 
decrease after 1996 (see Figure 2.). 
  
                                                
46 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bokros_package  
47 The influences of politics on the media in Hungary will be discussed in the second chapter. 
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Figure 2: The results of Alliance of Free Democrats on parliamentary elections in Hungary, 
1990-2010 (%) 
 
 
 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
% of seats won on the parliamentary 
elections 24% 18% 6% 5% 5% 0% 
% of votes for party lists in multi-member 
constituencies 21% 20% 8% 6% 7% 3% 
Source: National Election Office (www.valasztas.hu)48 
Notes: In 2010 Alliance of Free Democrats established the party list in the multi-seat constituency with the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum. 
 
A public opinion research49 in November 1996 pointed out that about the 90% of the voters of 
Alliance of Free Democrats50 deplored the government because of the Tocsik case. This ratio was 
the same regarding the voters of the parties in opposition but was only 64% among the supporters of 
the Hungarian Socialist Party. It is also noteworthy that 98% of the Hungarian adult population 
have heard about the Tocsik-case by the end of October 1996. 
After continuously suffering heavy losses of voters since 1998, the Alliance of Free Democrats was 
dissolved in 2013. In the 2010 parliamentary election, Alliance of Free Democrats won only 0.25 
percent of the vote and became an extra-parliamentary party for the first time since 1990.51 
The socialist party too had some victims because of the Tocsik-case (see Figure 3). As it was 
mentioned earlier, Tamás Suchman, the minister responsible for matters of privatization, was 
dismissed from his position by PM Gyula Horn. Imre Szokai and his team were sacrificed by PM 
                                                
48 http://valtor.valasztas.hu/valtort/jsp/t0.jsp  
49 https://web.archive.org/web/19980116040649/http://www.median.hu/korrupt.html  
50 As it was mentioned earlier, György Budai, an entrepreneur associated with the Alliance of Free Democrats was 
involved in the money transfers. 
51 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance_of_Free_Democrats  
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Gyula Horn, as well. Also the popularity of the Hungarian Socialist Party declined soon after the 
outbreak of the Tocsik-case reaching its minimum level52 considering the period between 1995 and 
2002. 
 
Figure 3: Supporters for Hungarian Socialist Party among eligible voters, based on the data 
of Szonda-Ipsos, 1995-2002 (%) 
%
 
Source: http://www.wargo.hu/tij/publications/melkoz_02.pdf 
Note: the outbreak of the Tocsik-case is marked by the red line on the chart. 
 
The editorial staff of Figyelő received the Hungarian Joseph Pulitzer Memorial Prize in 1997.  
                                                
52 The first article of Figyelő was published on the 18th September 1996. Based on the opinion polls’ results the 
popularity of the Hungarian Socialist Party decreased from 22% to 12% in January 1997. 
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2. Investigation with serious consequences: the role of media in the István Kocsis case 
 
Relevance 
The case of István Kocsis may have influenced not only the eponymous career but also the results 
of the elections held in 2010 as the campaign and rhetoric of FIDESZ was partly grounded on the 
corruption scandals of its political opponents. It can be assumed based on the interviews that the 
leak of the information about the corruption was scheduled on this purpose too. The source of the 
leaked information remained unidentified, but presumably it is originated from the Intelligence or 
some groups with conflicting interests. The scandal of István Kocsis is also a good example to 
demonstrate the relationship between the media and the advertisers in Hungary. The journalists had 
positive, both active (enforcer or initiator) and passive (reporter or facilitator) roles in presenting the 
scandal too, like in the case of the Tocsik-scandal. But in addition the negative behaviour can be 
also traced in the passivity of the journalists as a consequence of the influence of MVM on the 
advertising market. 
 
Background 
István Kocsis led MVM53, an entirely state owned company between 2004 and 2008. This group 
incorporates among others the Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. Kocsis was dismissed in mid 2008, at 
the behest of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the former socialist prime minister. The real reason of this is still 
unclear but it happened allegedly because of Kocsis’s more and more extensive relationship to the 
right-wing party (Fidesz). 
On 14th January 2008 MVM granted a 4,3 million EUR loan to its affiliate, Niker d.o.o., ’to finance 
the high-standard recreation of the employees of the MVM Group’.54 It turned out later that this 
happened without the approval of the Board. At this time the CEO of MVM was István Kocsis. 
NIKER paid 3,5 million EUR to Jadran Investments Limited as a lease for Hotel Bili Kamen in 
Vodice, Croatia. Jadran Investment was a company registered in the UK having offshore status. 
Some months later, on 17th July 2008 the contract was terminated after the replacement of István 
Kocsis. Jadran should have paid the amount of the rent back according to the contract, but this 
never happened. NIKER registered a mortgage on the hotel; the repayment deadline expired on 19th 
January 2009 but Jadran did not pay. However, not everything was clear about the mortgage either: 
according to certain evaluations the hotel was worth less than 3.5 million EUR. Besides, NIKER 
wanted to ensure that no further mortgages would be registered on the hotel and it would not be 
                                                
53 MVM Hungarian Electricity Private Limited Company (MVM Zrt.), http://mvm.hu/?lang=en  
54 http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2009/06/29/az_mvm_a_vezer_felesegetol_berelt_szallodat/ 
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sold before the case was closed, but Croatian authorities rejected the request. The report of MVM’s 
inner investigation calculated a total loss of 3.8 million EUR. 
Tamás Bodoky, a journalist writing for Index.hu, discovered that according to the British 
Companies House’s database, the real owner of Jadran Investments is ‘Mrs. Istvan Kovacs’ (see 
Figure 4.). The company was founded on 28th March 2007; and it had neither income not 
expenditures in the 2007-2008 fiscal year, which ended on 31st March 2008. The only shareholder 
was a firm registered on the British Virgin Islands, which is a tax haven. One of the Companies 
House’s documents states that the ‘ultimate controlling party’ is ‘Mrs. Istvan Kovacs’. 
 
Figure 4: The document proving the involvement of Mrs. Istvan Kocsis 
 
Source: http://bit.ly/1THLZAf 
 
István Kocsis claimed that neither he nor his wife had anything to do with Jadran Investment and he 
planned legal actions because of malicious usage of his name. 
The lawsuit against István Kocsis and five other persons began in 2011. Kocsis was acquitted but 
his wife and his main consultant were sentenced to suspended jail sentence in the first instance in 
2013. According to the justification, the investments of Kocsis were actually included in the 
medium-term objectives of MVM. Additionally, the indictment was insufficient and erroneous. 
According to the indictment, 12 billion HUF was returned to MVM from the 15 billion financial 
loss caused by Kocsis and his companions55 but articles do not specify how.  
 
                                                
55See: http://bit.ly/1O0PrJj 
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Outbreak of the case in the media 
An inner investigation of the supervisory board of Ernst and Young drew attention to suspicious 
transactions between 2004 and 2008 at MVM Hungarian Electricity Ltd. Many of the Hungarian 
editorial offices received the documents containing the results of this investigation in their 
mailboxes. Tamás Bodoky, the journalist of a Hungarian news portal, Index.hu was the first who 
revealed the results of the enquiry by writing a series of articles based on the document and his own 
investigation. The other news outlets did not deal with the documents they received. Based on our 
interviews we can assume that the reason for this phenomenon is in connection with the momentous 
role of MVM and Paks Nuclear Power Plant on the advertising market56; the decision about whether 
the case should be published or not, was in the hand of the managers and owners of the news outlets 
it was not the responsibility of the journalists. 
Furthermore, the politically engaged news outlets also left this topic out of their focus, presumably 
because both political sides were affected in the case – in the meantime the right-wing Fidesz-
related media continuously confronted the socialist-liberal government with other corruption cases 
(for example the Hagyó-case57). These two reasons caused a negative, passive attitude towards the 
scandal. As Bodoky did not have competition in reporting this topic, he could elaborate the case 
thoroughly, without time pressure. 
Tamás Bodoky’s role in the case should considered both passive and active positive 
(reporter/facilitator and enforcer/initiator). His work was initially based on a report describing the 
investigation of Ernst and Young that his editorial office received unintentionally. However, he 
later interviewed István Kocsis and gathered some further information about the cases, because the 
documents he received contained insufficient evidence. His work also contributed to the subsequent 
lawsuit. 
The first article of Tamás Bodoky was published on the 10th March 2009 on Index.hu58 with the title 
“MVM-billons for offshore companies” – István Kocsis was the CEO of the Budapest Transport 
Company (BKV ZRt.) at this time. The article referred to the documents of the inner investigations 
about the financial transactions of the period when István Kocsis led the MVM, initiated by its new 
management. However it revealed only another issue of the MVM’s solicitous transactions, the 
Hotel Bili Kamen case was not even mentioned until the 18th March 2009, when Tamás Bodoky’s 
second article59 (“The lost hotel”) was published. The editors of Index.hu also asked the new 
                                                
56 The impact of the potential advertisers on the media is discussed in the second chapter. 
57 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miklós_Hagyó  
58 http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2009/03/10/mvm-milliardok_offshore_cegeknek/  
59 http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2009/03/18/az_elveszett_szalloda/  
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management of MVM about the recent developments regarding the corruption cases responding 
that they know about the transactions and are trying to minimize the losses of the company. 
Two weeks later Tamás Bodoky and Gergely Dudás, another journalist of Index.hu interviewed 
István Kocsis60. He said that he does not expect to be prosecuted by the MVM as there were 
changes in the management of the nuclear power plant in Paks61 and that was the aim of leaking out 
the documents about the investigations. He also said that the offshore companies had to be involved 
with the Hotel Bili Kamen case because of the sellers of the hotel who did not want to pay taxes in 
Croatia. 
Gergely Dudás also interviewed Imre Mártha62, the new CEO of MVM at the end of March 2009. 
He regretted what happened during the era of his predecessor. However, he also said that the 
articles dealing with the corruption cases of István Kocsis show a negative image about the MVM 
on the one hand, but on the other they proved that the new management did not refute or blanched 
over the incidents. 
Meanwhile the rival printed and online newspapers did not really care about the corruption cases of 
MVM. The two traditional Hungarian newspapers, Magyar Nemzet 63 64  and Népszabadság 65 
published only two short articles regarding the cases in March 2009. In contrast, on Index.hu, five 
articles dealt with them in that month and Tamás Bodoky did not stop publishing information about 
the cases in the following months. Figyelő also published some coverage of the case following 
Index.hu.  
The discussion of the cases was revived again in June 2009 when several news outlets received a 
document package from the sender “Dr. Kocsis István” again66. The documents contained the 
results of the inner investigations of MVM conducted by Squire Sanders Legal Counsel Worldwide 
/ Erős Ügyvédi Iroda, a reputable law firm. The Hotel Bili Kamen case was revealed again too. 
However, the news outlets other than Index.hu were not really engaged in the case. 
András Szász, a consultant of István Kocsis who was involved in some of the offshore companies 
affected in the cases also presented some documents for Index.hu about the doubtful businesses of 
MVM. These documents indicated that the aim of these activities was to prepare some businesses in 
the Balkan that could make MVM a main actor of the region. Tamás Bodoky posed the question in 
the title of his article: “Is the MVM case a giant bubble or a missed possibility?” The following day 
                                                
60 see : http://bit.ly/1TRs9YO  
61 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/suli_janos_a_paksi_atomeromu_zrt__uj_vezerigazgatoja-325752  
62 http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2009/03/20/martha_interju/  
63 Meaning Hungarian Nation in English, a daily Hungarian centre-right newspaper owned by Lajos Simicska, who was 
in close partnership with Viktor Orbán at that time. 
64 http://mno.hu/migr_1834/adriai_szallo_fantomcegtol-338327  
65 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/lap-20090313-20090313-67-324443  
66 See: http://bit.ly/1Y0tH2z  
 19 
MVM issued a notice that stated that the dubious transactions were not commercially justified and 
the MVM’s strategy does not involve the need for offshore businesses67. 
In June 2009 Tamás Bodoky discovered that according to the British Companies House’s public 
database, the real owner of Jadran Investments is ‘Mrs. Istvan Kovacs’68. István Kovács was also 
asked by the journalists of Index.hu about the role of his wife in the suspicious transactions but he 
rejected that his family had anything to do with the company. He also said that he is planning legal 
actions against Jadran Investments because of the inadequate data. 
 
The media representation of the case in the following period 
“Politics Can Be Different” (LMP), a green-liberal political party in parliamentary opposition 
submitted a data request to make the results of the investigation of Ernst and Young and Squire 
Sanders Legal Counsel Worldwide / Erős Ügyvédi Iroda and any other documents in connection 
with the dubious businesses of MVM pubic in the summer of 2009. Nevertheless, MVM had denied 
this request, so LMP initiated legal proceedings that would become inexplicably long. In 2010 and 
2011 Tamás Bodoky who left Index.hu in the meantime wrote several articles69 about the lawsuit 
between LMP and MVM published in Élet és Irodalom70 and Átlátszó.hu71. 
In 2011 several major news outlets reported about the lawsuit72 and published portrait73 articles 
about István Kocsis. These portraits presented István Kocsis as a protected and privileged person 
before the outbreak of the scandals around MVM. The journalists also evoked that notwithstanding 
István Kocsis was a director of the NPAM during the Tocsik-scandal and while the complete 
directorate was fired after the outbreak of that case, Kocsis was just demoted to vice-director. 
 
Conclusions 
After the publication of Tamás Bodoky’s articles, the National Bureau of Investigation began to 
investigate as well. In 2012 April there were already 11 distinct cases identified74. One of the most 
quoted cases was the Croatian hotel renting case. 
The lawsuit is still in progress against István Kocsis (the acquittal at first instance was annulled at 
second instance), and several news outlets have published reports about it.; the topic is not 
                                                
67 See: http://bit.ly/1qZfKV6  
68 See: http://bit.ly/1O6EENW  
69 See: http://bit.ly/1sOYUtw  
70 Meaning Life and Literature in English, a weekly Hungarian magazine about literature and politics. 
71 Átlátszó means “Transparent” in Hungarian. Átlátszó is an NGO and an online news outlet for investigative 
journalism founded by Tamás Bodoky in 2011, after he had left Index. 
72 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130802_Gyanusitotta_valt_Mrs_K and http://bit.ly/1O0PrJj 
73 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/20110817-egy_sokaig_vedett_szemely-1171101 
http://index.hu/belfold/2011/09/08/kocsis_istvan_mindig_mindent_tulel/ 
74 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130802_Gyanusitotta_valt_Mrs_K 
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forbidden anymore. In addition the Hungarian Telegraphic Office75, the news agency of the 
Hungarian public media also publishes reports about the news regarding the lawsuit. These are 
often quoted by the news outlets76. 
Based on the progress of the lawsuit and the opinion of our interviewees the question whether 
István Kocsis is politically doomed or not is still open. Népszabadság made conjectures77 on István 
Kocsis’s activity in connection with Russian and Hungarian contracts about the expansion of Paks 
nuclear power plant and regarding the government’s energy market strategy based on its journalist’s 
sources. However, MVM stated that István Kocsis does not have any relation with itself or its 
companies. All in all, Isván Kocsis was mentioned as one of the most mysterious person between 
the Hungarian businessmen – presumably he wanted to build up a regional group of firms following 
the example of Sándor Csányi with the OTP Bank Group78 or Zsolt Hernádi with the MOL Group79. 
 
3. The István Papp case and lack of media involvement 
 
Relevance 
István Papp was the leader of a quite unknown authority and also without major political affiliations 
himself was not a well-known person. The case did not seem to be interesting for the public. As a 
result, the journalists had passive, both negative (lazy) and positive (reporter or facilitator) roles in 
presenting the scandal. 
 
Background80 
In 2006, the Hungarian Parliament tightened rules in the Labour Code in order to counter 
undeclared work. Hence, companies, which break the law could not only be issued a fine on, but 
they could also be disqualified from public procurement tenders and public funding. This sanction 
could be often much more damaging than even a large fine – especially for companies in 
construction and agriculture.  
The Hungarian Labour Inspectorate (HLI)81 was authorized to carry out investigations and to decide 
which consequences should apply to the lawbreakers. The HLI usually phrased its decisions 
deceivingly; they did not mention the disqualification from public procurement, only the fines. As a 
result, a large number of companies faced the consequences only when their application for a tender 
                                                
75 Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI) 
76 For example: http://bit.ly/1sqLJPz; http://bit.ly/1VzePaP and http://bit.ly/22A7pFl  
77 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/kocsis-istvan-ujra-aktiv-1604871  
78 https://www.otpbank.hu/portal/en/AboutUs/OTPGroup  
79 http://mol.hu/en/about-mol/who-we-are  
80 Sources: http://bit.ly/1TZOKkc  and http://bit.ly/1TLx3Bg and http://bit.ly/1PeB9Fj  
81 Országos Munkavédelmi és Munkaügyi Főfelügyelőség (OMMF) 
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was rejected. The fact of disqualification was registered on a website maintained by the 
Inspectorate, but only with codes without the legend. According to Budapest Metropolitan Court82, 
some of the high-ranking officials of HLI instructed their employees to retract or to alter some of 
the online data to enable certain companies to apply for public procurement tenders and public 
funds. The president, István Papp was also involved. 
In 2008, an investigation was launched in response to an anonymous letter. The authorities obtained 
a “green notebook” from one of the defendant’s relatives. After this they used clandestine methods 
to gather evidence, e.g. phone tapping and analysing the paper waste of the HLI. Later a large part 
of this evidence was not allowed to be used during the lawsuit because of procedural irregularities. 
When István Papp and his colleagues became aware of the investigation, many documents were 
destroyed on their instruction.  
On the 23th of January 2012, a criminal suit was launched against István Papp, the former president 
of the HLI, and some of his colleagues (Zoltán Cseke – he was the head of legal and audit 
department –, László G., Mónika D., Borbála P., Gabriella M-né K. and two further high-ranking 
officials). The charge was abuse of authority and forgery. Papp was found guilty on fourteen counts 
of forgery committed by a public official and three counts of abuse of authority. Zoltán Cseke was 
convicted on thirteen counts of forgery committed by a public official and one count of abuse of 
authority. They were sentenced for nine and seven months of imprisonment in the first instance 
respectively. Another accused colleague was sentenced for half year and four accuses were 
acquitted. Papp and Cseke had already fulfilled their sentence by than during preliminary detention. 
During the judicial proceedings, it was not proven that the public officials received money from the 
companies involved in the scandal. If the payments had been proven, the minimal punishment 
would have been three years of incarceration. 
 
The representation of the case in the media 
The media began to deal with the case after the investigations were launched, in April 2008. The 
first articles were published by Magyar Nemzet83 based on the reports of Hír TV84 about the 
beginning of the investigations, but it was not discovered that István Papp was involved in the 
corruption at that time. The reporter of Hír TV asked István Papp about the investigations. He 
confirmed that an inquiry was in progress by the National Bureau of Investigation85 but he added 
that he does not exactly know its subject. He also said that it is impossible to disregard the 
                                                
82 Fővárosi Törvényszék 
83 http://mno.hu/belfold/fontos-cegek-es-elnezo-munkaugyi-felugyelok-az-nni-nyomoz-383004  
84 Meaning News TV in English, a centre-right television channel with the same ownership as Magyar Nemzet. 
85 In Hungarian: Nemzeti Nyomozó Iroda (NNI) 
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sentences imposed by the inspectors. One day later the journalist of Magyar Nemzet also asked 
István Papp about the circumstances of the investigation, but he said that he heard about the 
investigation from the broadcast of Hír TV. 
In December 2008 when István Papp and Zoltán Cseke had been arrested several news outlets 
published articles about the case based on the report of the Hungarian Telegraphic Office (see 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: The number of reports and articles dealing with the István Papp case 
 
Note: the analysis is based on the online search engines of the following news outlets: HVG, Heti Válasz, Magyar 
Nemzet, Népszabadság, Index, Origo, RTL Klub, ATV, Átlátszó, Pesti Srácok, Népszava, Hír TV. 
Only those years are presented in which reports or articles were published about the István Papp case. 
 
In addition, Magyar Nemzet tried to draw attention to a suspicious issue related to HLI and a firm in 
the concern of the current socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in its articles86. The special 
attention from the centre-right media manifested in an article87 published in Demokrata88 too. 
However, the attention of the journalists waned quickly, and only nine articles were published about 
the investigations between 2009 and 2011 in the online media89. 
With the beginning of the lawsuit in 2012 the number of articles in connection with the case 
suddenly increased, mainly by quoting the report of the Hungarian Telegraphic Office again90. 
                                                
86 http://mno.hu/migr_1834/lakat_alatt_a_fofelugyelo-357191  
87 http://www.demokrata.hu/cikk/elvtarsi-bukta-0  
88 Meaning Democrat in English, a centre-right weekly magazine. 
89 http://k-monitor.hu/adatbazis/cimkek/papp-istvan-ommf  
90 http://index.hu/belfold/2012/01/23/megkezdodott_a_volt_ommf-elnok_pere/  
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However, Hír TV sent an on-site correspondent to the court91. Since then some reports were 
published about the progress of the lawsuit. 
 
Conclusions 
The behaviour of the journalists can be regarded as inactive or lazy because they mostly quoted the 
reports of the Hungarian Telegraphic Office. However, some further reports were also published 
and broadcasted, mainly by the centre-right media presumably because of political reasons. But 
articles only presented the results of the investigation and the trial without revealing any new 
information about the corruption. 
Hardly anyone of the interviewed journalists and media experts could immediately recall the story 
of István Papp when they were asked about it; moreover, some of them did not know about it at all. 
Additionally, the interviewees who could recall the details of the case said that the people who were 
affected in the corruption were unknown to the public and also their organization does not cause 
much interest. These factors can lead to the passive behaviour of the media, even if the method or 
the extent of corruption is scandalous, because an extremely shocking story is needed, if the media 
must make a person or an organization famous and interesting. An infringement itself, if not 
committed by a politician, is not interesting enough for the Hungarian public and therefore the 
journalists did not put too much effort to deal with such cases. 
Finally, based on the interviews, the opportunity to abuse PM Ferenc Gyurcsány on the grounds of 
this case should be highlighted. There were some attempts to do this in the centre-right media, but 
these were not memorable either. István Papp was not well-known before his scandal and also he 
did not become notorious after his case became public. 
After the scandal not only István Papp and some of colleagues were fired but the HLI was 
integrated into the Government Offices in 2011.  
                                                
91 http://hirtv.hu/ahirtvhirei/vadlottak-padjan-az-ommf-fejesei-video-1045461  
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4. The media as follower: the Eclipse case 
 
Relevance 
The analysis of the following case is of great significance for several reasons. Despite the fact that 
this corruption case was of great importance, journalists behaved very passively as a constellation 
of the following patterns: 
1. they only observed the happenings; 
2. not only does the case itself represents an instance of corruption, but the investigation of the 
case itself (investigators covering up and faking information, and acting in a biased way) is 
corrupt as well; 
3. all the time the media focused on the political ties related to the case, and neglected to cover 
the violation of the rules of competition and legal procedure during the investigation, 
ignoring the rule of law in general; 
4. finally, during the investigation of the case steps taken to threaten the actors (both those 
concerned and journalists) were indicative of organized crime. 
 
Furthermore, the detection of corruption was relatively quick – it took only a few months, and the 
investigation and the trial six years later have not been closed yet. Despite all this, the media do not 
cover the details of the trial. 
This case from late 2009 is in itself a very peculiar one. All of the followings can be detected in this 
case: rent seeking, monopoly set up by the state, crony capitalism, secret public procurement, 
overpricing (about 50 times higher prices) accompanying corruption, the role of the Intelligence; 
political favouritism and the lack of integrity during investigation, the slowness of the Hungarian 
judiciary, which is a sign of legal uncertainty, organised crime, the intimidation of actors in the 
case, the disappearance of one actor (a broker or straw man). The court trial has not been finished 
yet, i. e. there has been no res judicata (claim preclusion) ever since the first arrests were made in 
March 2010. 
 
Background92 
In Hungary, the vehicle's origin identification is a procedure whereby the properties and 
documentation of a particular vehicle may be checked against those in the public records. The 
companies responsible for this service didn't emerge from the market , but were rather established 
                                                
92 For the description of timeline of Eclipse case we used our former background study “Organized Crime and Political 
Corruption”, OCC Country Report – Hungary, edited by Szidónia Nagy – Zoltán Szántó – István János Tóth, 
(ANTICORRP program, WP9). 
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by state intervention in 199993. The Hungarian state claimed that it would be an effective weapon 
against car theft, but it's has not been proven that the procedure, and the industry behind it, ever had 
any significant effect on automobile theft rates in Hungary. The Hungarian regulation made it 
compulsory for car owners to pay for this procedure upon every change in a car's ownership. In 
2004, the state set regulated prices for the procedure. The overall software development and 
integration cost 345 million forints in 1999, of which the software itself accounted for 80 million. 
There were only six companies in Hungary in this market, the leaders of the companies all were 
connected socially. The regulation also set the stipulations which allowed them to specialize and 
organize themselves as a cartel. The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) inquired into this 
regulation and asked for the justifying documents from the Ministry in 2002, but all the regarding 
documents had disappeared from the Ministry of Internal Affairs94. 
The “Eclipse Informatikai Rendszerház” Zrt (“Eclipse Informatic Systems private company limited 
by shares, ltd.) was founded on April 14th 2004 by Endre Deák and László Hagymási. The 
company's main activity was the inspection of vehicles' origins. The regulation changed ten days 
before and set the activity at regulated price. Endre Deák was joint owner in another firm (Eclipse 
Asset Management Kft.) with the former leader of the Hungarian Special Service for National 
Security (Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal [NBH] in Hungarian), Ferenc Hevesi Tóth95. One of Hevesi 
Tóth's own companies was registered to the same office, where Eclipse Informatikai Rendszerház 
ltd. was.  
The newly founded Eclipse Informatikai Rendszerház ltd. ("Eclipse") immediately received a 
contract from the government, to produce the software for this inspection of origin, despite the fact 
that the procurement tender had been successively put out three times. Eclipse's first offer was 5,89 
billion forints (31 million $), the third was 3,68 billion forints (19.9 million $). 
The exact date of the procurement is unknown, as the open procurement was classified, on the basis 
that "the suppliers and operators may get information about qualified IT security data during the 
implementation of the information technology" according to the Hungarian Parliament's National 
Security Committee. The National Security Committee classified all further procurements on the 
topic on March 23th 200596, after the second unsuccessful tender. 
                                                
93 See the analsyis of the Hungarian Competition Authority: http://bit.ly/1TLa21o  
94 See: http://figyelo.hu/cikkek/160398_titkosan_dragabb and http://bit.ly/1PeWU7V  
95 Ferenc Hevesi Tóth was the leader of the bureau which provided technical equipment to the Hungarian Secret Service 
for an unknown period in the 90's. He was charged with serious economical crimes worth tens of millions of forints by 
the Hungarian Military Prosecutionin 2000. He was acquitted in 2003, however, on the basis of a lack of hazard to the 
public and lack of crime, see: http://index.hu/belfold/2012/03/27/megkezdodott_eclipse-ugy_buntetopere/  
96 See the analysis of the Hungarian Competition Authority: http://bit.ly/1XaVe2o  
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The software development was finally completed by Eclipse97 for 4,96 billion forints (cca. 24.8 
million $), since the state later revised Eclipse's contract with a further tasks costing 1,28 billion 
forints (6.8 million $) -- although this revision was for a "completely useless process", according to 
GVH's later findings. Software capable of completing the same task cost only cca. 80 million 
forints (cca. 400,700 $) in 1999 by estimation of Figyelő98. It means a 65 (!!) times overpricing 
compared to the market price. The system was improved for another 1,28 billion forints in April 
2007, and Eclipse also won classified procurements for software products for checking vehicle's 
road worthiness for another 5-6 billion forints in 200699 and again in 2007, based on GVH's 
findings. There is no record about how transfers went in 2008-2009 between the state and Eclipse, 
but according to a later investigation100, they won at least another 6,82 billion forints (33.7 million 
$) in classified procurements from unknown bureaus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The project 
manager for the procurements at Eclipse was Hajnalka Pintér, the daughter of the formal Interior 
Minister, Sándor Pintér101. Eclipse also loaned its office from a company formerly owned by 
Sándor Pintér (Civil Biztonsági Szolgálat Zrt. , on 77th Angol utca, Budapest, zip code: 1149). 
The whole origin-checking-system was reorganized in the summer of 2009 under a new name. The 
Administrative and Electronic Public Utilities Bureau was then responsible for the inspections of 
vehicles' origins102. The first article was about the strange nature of the industry on August 7th 
2009103, and the author of this article immediately reported that he was subsequently placed under 
surveillance by unknown actors104.  
                                                
97 Eclipse is a software company, whose homepage cynically has a blank whitepage, with a short a black lettered label 
in the middle, saying: "Welcome to the real world..." This homepage is still online, see: http://eclipseinfo.hu/  
98 See: http://bit.ly/1PeWU7V. 
99 The inspection of a vehicle's origin at every change of the car's ownership, was a slowly dying business at the time. It 
costs around 7200 forints per car for the owner for a five minute inspection, and more than 10 billion for the state on 
average per year for the whole system. But stolen cars were just not brought to the checking-places (6-700 in the whole 
country), they were sent abroad or sold as parts. The police developed a lot cheaper and way more effective methods to 
spot out stolen cars.  But the regulation connected the expensive compulsory origin-checks with the also compulsory 
road worthiness tests.  Every car needs road worthiness tests periodically, so it boosted up the origin inspection business 
as well. The state also made compulsory the origin inspections to those vehicles, that had not changed owner in the 
previous 8 years in May 2007. In the first month, 15 thousand vehicles had been inspected, and only 20 was stolen. In 
all cases, those vehicle's were stolen so long ago, that those crimes' limitation period were long overdue. See 
http://bit.ly/1XaVe2o. After a year, 110 stolen cars were found with this method from 133 thousand and checked. See 
Figyelő: http://figyelo.hu/cikkek/160398_titkosan_dragabb. 
100  See http://bit.ly/1PeWU7V.  
101 Sándor Pintér was Chief of National Police between 1991-1996, one of the leading figures of Fidesz party, Interior 
Minister between 1998-2002, also from 2010 till now (May 30 2016). 
102 In September 2009, one of Eclipse's employee, the former football player, Imre Katzenbach disappeared, after taking 
500 million forints (cca. 2,5 million USD) cash from the company's account. See: http://bit.ly/1Y0w7yj. He was one of 
the persons responsible for money laundering. He left his car, his papers, and his keys at home, and was never seen 
again, see http://bit.ly/1sYnfh5. His disappearance had become public only six months later. 
103 See Figyelő: http://figyelo.hu/cikkek/160398_titkosan_dragabb  
104 See: http://antagon.blog.hu/2009/08/07/egy_figyelo_cikk_margojara  
 27 
This Bureau suddenly terminated all contracts with former service providers in the area on 
December 22th 2009, though their contracts were signed until the end of 2010105. Nine days later, 
on Decemer 31th 2009 Eclipse won a classified procurement for 4,95 billion forints (cca. 24.5 
million $) as a negotiated procedure without the prior publication of a contract notice. They have 
become the main contractor for the whole origin inspection industry in the country for 5 years, and 
have had to develop a new system for the new needs of the Ministry. The other companies in the 
industry sent a petition to the prime minister to rescind this move106. 
The new system went live 4 days later, from January 4th 2010. As the other companies in the 
industry immediately realized, the brand new software was completely identical to that used in 2007 
and they filed a report to the Attorney General for fraudulent misuse of funds, infringement of 
business secrets, and malfeasance on January 22th 2010. 
The Attorney General ordered an investigation on February 11th 2010 into possible money 
laundering and tax fraud. Seven leaders of Eclipse were arrested on March 10th 2010. The police 
confiscated 9 top category sport cars107, one of them belonging to an unknown foreigner, 30 million 
forints cash, and 52 million on Eclipse's bank account. The only named suspect was Endre Deák. 
The Attorney General's office admitted that they received 32 reports from different actors against 
Eclipse in the previous months108. Hajnalka Pintér (the daughter of the minister of the interior of 
Fidesz government from 2010) was excluded from the investigation from the beginning, she was 
never asked even as a witness. 
The state didn't modify any existing regulations, so Eclipse's software remained in use. Eclipse was 
forced by the government to make a statement that there were no criminal procedures against any of 
the workers involved in operating the system. An unknown Eclipse leader made this statement from 
detention109. After this, the whole investigation had been classified at an unknown date.  
The director of one of Eclipse's public main clients, György Eiselt110, was questioned by the 
prosecution on July 12th 2011. The leader of the other public client, István Ignácz111, was never 
                                                
105 2010 was a parliamentary election year in Hungary. These elections are always held in the spring. 
106 See Figyelő: http://figyelo.hu/cikkek/146142_szilveszteri_mulatsag  
107 The brand of cars was Aston Martin, Ferrari, Lamborghini and Porsche. One of them was this white Lamborghini: 
http://index.hu/belfold/2010/03/12/esclipse/  
108 See Nepszabadsag : http://bit.ly/25y7DSx  
109 See Figyelő: http://figyelo.hu/cikkek/140413_az_eclipse_szoftveret_kell_hasznalni  
110 György Eiselt was the director of one of the two bureaus at the Interior Ministry, who bought overvalued services 
from Eclipse for years. He was the former Head of Secretariat for Sándor Pintér and later Deputy Secretary of State 
under Pintér. Eiselt got a German license plated new Mercedes from Eclipse in 2009, the car confiscated during the 
investigation. Eiselt resigned as the Deputy Secretary of State in June 2011, but he remained Head of Department in the 
Interior Ministry, led by Sándor Pintér again (Index [2011a]). 
111  István Ignácz was the director of one of the other bureau at the Interior Ministry, who bought overvalued services 
from Eclipse for years. He was the Chief of Police in Pest and later in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties during 1998-
2002, when Pintér was Interior Minister. 
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questioned and never became a suspect 112. During the investigation, the leading prosecutor and 
several detectives were forced to retire. Some of the detectives claimed that crucial evidence had 
been heavily manipulated113. 
In December 2011 Public prosecution’s accusation against Eclipse leaders was tax fraud worth 1,3 
billion forints, money laundering, and malfeasance. At least another 15 billion forints in cash 
disappeared from Eclipse114. 
On January 9th 2011 a building contractor's car was blown up, though nobody was hurt. On January 
22nd 2011, one of Eclipse's former programmer's car was blown up with exactly the same method 
and the same type of Yugoslavian hand grenade; again, nobody was hurt115. For a short but not 
precisely known period, two former Heads of the Special Service for National Security, and former 
Deputy Secretary of State György Szilvásy was also arrested116. 
According to the court's decision all of the suspects were acquitted on the basis of lack of proof, on 
January 8th 2013117. The prosecution appealed, a motion which was approved by the Court of 
Appeal. The case now sits at the Municipal Court of Budapest again118. 
 
The representation of the case in the media 
As can be seen the baseline of Eclipse is relatively simple: the state excluded actors from a not too 
big market by setting up regulations for its limitation. The state made public procurement 
confidential, and this public procurement basically determines market shares, and this resulted in 
creating a special software by a private company with good political and Intelligence contacts. With 
this step the state generated a monopolistic position and rent for this firm. And consequences did 
appear: the bribery of one high level state official and the approximate 65 (!!) times higher price of 
the product at the tender as compared to its estimated market price. 
Besides highlighting the passivity of the media there are three further characteristics to draw 
attention to. First, the media followed the events of the trial in a very superficial way, even though 
during the trial a lot of details came up that could have clarified the case and the investigation, and 
could further clarify the interpretation of the case. This phenomenon can be observed in general as 
well. The Hungarian media hardly ever deal with the afterlife of a corruption case (mostly only on 
the level of news coverage), or with the information gained at the trials, or with interpreting 
standpoints. As if the information gained from witnesses, suspects, plaintiffs, lawyers, and 
                                                
112 See Nepszabadsag: http://bit.ly/1O1pMAr  
113 See Nepszabadsag: http://bit.ly/1sphcBJ  
114 See index.hu: http://index.hu/belfold/2012/01/03/vadat_emeltek_az_eclipse-ugyben/  
115 See index.hu: http://bit.ly/1Vsh1kl  
116 See index.hu: http://index.hu/belfold/2013/01/08/eclipse_itelethez/  
117 See http://bit.ly/22vuhpp, http://bit.ly/280mtQu, http://bit.ly/28XvdSk and http://bit.ly/1P0u1al  
118 See: http://bit.ly/21VvcPN  
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prosecutors during the trial did not have any significance for introducing and interpreting details of 
the case. The behaviour of the media could be related to the fact that although in Hungary the 
prestige of the judiciary is getting better, it can still be regarded as kind of mediocre. Hungarian 
citizens and Hungarian organisations have only moderately strong trust in the Hungarian 
judiciary119 (see Figure 6.). 
 
Figure 6: Satisfaction of SME120s with the performance of certain Hungarian public 
institutions and offices, 2005-2010, points 
 
Source: Institute for Economic and Enterprise Research (www.gvi.hu) 
Notes: the respondents (heads of SMEs) could evaluate the performance of the public institutions and offices on a five-
grade scale. The survey was conducted in October each year. 
 
Secondly, concerning the news and the coverage, the news media basically focus on the real or 
imagined involvement of politicians. Meanwhile – apart from a few exceptions – they almost totally 
neglect the three fundamental aspects of the case that question the foundations of  the market 
economy and those of the rule of law: the first step of the case that created the unjustified 
possibility for rent seeking (i); the corruption case and the extreme overpricing that were the results 
of the afore mentioned (ii); the peculiar mistakes of the investigation that suggest the likelihood of 
the investigation authority being biased and corrupt (iii). 
                                                
119 http://communicatio.hu/jelkep/2012/1_4/bakonyi_eszter.htm  
http://gvi.hu/files/researches/357/kkv_korkep_104_tanulmany_101129.pdf  
120 Small and medium entreprises 
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Thirdly, the important characteristics of this case is that the presence of the Intelligence can be 
assumed based on the interviews with the investigative journalists121. The suspects of the case had 
very good relations with the Special Service for National Security; the organisation had been 
previously “checked” by the NBH. According to the would-be Interior Minister that was the reason 
why his own daughter took up a position there, because she wanted to work for an “unblemished 
company”, and the NBH supervision served as a guarantee. 
The passivity of the media (see Figure 7.) could be explained with the fact that indirectly both 
political sides were involved in the case: MSZP government functionaries, indirectly the minister 
responsible for the Intelligence, György Szilvási, and the would-be Interior Minister, Sándor Pintér, 
whose daughter was a project manager at the company when the Eclipse case emerged. Since the 
Hungarian media are politically too polarized, it can be stated that neither the media connected to 
the left nor the media connected to the right had any interest in an in depth analysis of the case.122 
 
Figure 7: The number of reports and articles dealing with the Eclipse case 
 
Note: the analysis is based on the online search engines of the following news outlets: HVG, Heti Válasz, Magyar 
Nemzet, Népszabadság, Index, Origo, RTL Klub, ATV, Átlátszó, Pesti Srácok, Népszava, Hír TV. 
Only those years are presented in which reports or articles were published about the Eclipse case. 
 
  
                                                
121 Some general conclusions about role of Intelligence in the uncovering of corruption cases are discussed in chapter 
2.3. 
122 See Népszabadság: http://nol.hu/belfold/20110715-gyanusitott_gyanusitok-1136821. and Index: 
http://index.hu/belfold/2011/07/16/eclipse/  
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Conclusions 
This case clearly demonstrates when the media remains passive and just follows the events (i. e., 
not engaging in any deeper investigative efforts). In the media representation of this case neither the 
original government decision (market restriction, and creating a special privilege for a private 
company); nor its outcome, the enormous level of overpricing, nor the bribery case, nor the political 
influence of criminal investigation were highlighted. 
There were no investigative or more deeply analytical articles covering this case – most of the 
articles used only public information and reports on the court’s judgment. Investigative journalists 
did not team up in this case, i. e. the journalists worked alone. 
Exacerbating the relative passivity of the journalistic community were Eclipse’s good relations with 
the Intelligence community, and there were certain threatening actions during the case. Both 
political sides were affected in the case indirectly, so neither the right nor the left-wing media had 
any interest in dealing with this case in depth.  
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Main characteristics of investigative journalism in Hungary123 
 
 
 
 
1. Market structure and the influence of advertisements 
 
In Hungary after the transition in 1989-90, the newspapers published from the former era were 
privatised; new significant dailies were not founded124. In addition, as a result of the privatisation, 
the newspapers were tied to a select few companies; for example, the majority of the county 
newspapers were acquired by the Axel Springer125 with the support of the Hungarian Socialist 
Party. By 2003, three publishing houses gained nearly the half of the advertising revenues on the 
Hungarian print newspaper market (see Table 1.). The leading position of Axel Springer remained 
constant between 2003 and 2012. 
 
Table 1: The share of advertising revenues between publishing houses on the Hungarian print 
newspaper market, 2003-2012, % 
 
Publishing office 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AXEL SPRINGER-
MAGYARORSZÁG 20 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 20 19 
NÉPSZABADSÁG RT. 14 14 13 8 8 8 7 6 6 6 
RINGIER KIADÓ KFT. 12 15 12 12 12 12 13 15 14 15 
PANNON LAPOK 
TÁRSASÁGA 11 11 10 11 10 11 10 10 9 9 
MTG METRO GRATIS KFT. 10 10 11 11 9 9 10 12 14 17 
INFORM MÉDIA KFT. / 
RUSSMEDIA KFT. 10 11 11 13 14 15 13 12 12 10 
LAPCOM KFT. 8 9 10 10 11 12 12 12 12 11 
NEMZET LAP-ÉS 
KÖNYVKIADÓI KFT. 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 
Other 12 8 8 10 9 7 8 9 8 8 
Source: Kantar Media (http://www.kantarmedia.com/hu/ ), we would like to thank Zsuzsanna Mihalszki’s kind of 
assistance in providing us these information. 
Notes: Nemzet Lap- és Könyvkiadó is related to Lajos Simicska, whose role on the Hungarian media market will be 
described later in this chapter. 
 
                                                
123 In this chapter we strongly rely on the interviews we did with journalists and media experts (for details of the 
interviews, see Appendix 2.). Sources of information and institutions are prevalently anonymized. We indicate them by 
numbers: journalist1, journalist2, etc. 
124 Like Gazeta Wyborcza in Poland. 
125 In Hungary before 1990 each of 20 counties had their own newspapers. 
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The left-wing political tone of the county newspapers acquired by Axel Springer and Népszava and 
Népszabadság remained. New, principal news outlets would arrive later with the emergence of the 
Hungarian online media. 
The news outlets are heavily influenced by their advertisers, since the proportion of the advertising 
revenue is a considerably large portion of their overall incomes. In addition, the media also relies 
greatly on governmental advertising spending. The public advertising purchases can have some 
effects on the function and the behaviour of a news outlet that may threaten the freedom of the press 
since the government has the means to influence media content. The background study by the 
Corruption Research Center Budapest126 analysed the print media expenditure of government 
institutions and state-owned companies in Hungary between 2003 and 2012, pointing out that 
“… political changes deeply influenced the advertising market. The spending of state 
advertisements in Hungary is highly concentrated on a small group of government institutions 
and firms. The changes in the advertisement incomes of left and right wing leaning printed 
media follows closely the changes of governments. The advertising incomes of the leftist printed 
media had dramatically been decreasing from 2008, so that this sum had been reduced to less 
than one third of 2003 by 2012. The changes in the advertising incomes of the right wing media 
is similarly radical, but in the opposite direction. The state advertising incomes of the right 
wing media was more than two times higher in 2012 than in 2010.” 
 
This analysis also highlights the concentrated structure of the government advertising expenditures. 
On the one hand one or two organizations accounted for half of all payments while the 10 largest 
clients make up 3/4 of all spending. On the other hand, regarding the print media, a major part (25-
40%) of governmental advertising spending can be linked to newspapers with an undoubtedly 
defined political profile. The governments rewarded the press which was favourable to them by 
compelling governmental organizations and state-owned companies to purchase advertising space 
in these media products (see Table 2.). 
  
                                                
126 http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/media_ah_2012_report1_140417.pdf  
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Table 2: Level of political influence based on the state advertising revenue of civic print media 
Year 
Amount spent on advertising 
appearing in political papers 
(millions Ft) 
Amount spent on state 
advertising in political 
papers of the opposition 
(millions Ft) 
Proportion of advertisements 
in opposition papers compared 
to all political papers, % 
2003 970 184 18.9 
2004 1,045 155 14.8 
2005 1,501 307 20.5 
2006 1,309 260 19.9 
2007 1,453 485 33.4 
2008 1,445 469 32.5 
2009 1,131 379 33.5 
Jan-Apr 2010 298 101 33.9 
May-Dec 2010 507 234 46.2 
2011 1,025 130 12.7 
2012 1,280 118 9.2 
Source: calculations by the CRCB (www.crcb.eu) based on data from Kantar Media (www.kantarmedia.com) 
Note: *In 2010 there was a change in government, thus it’s not possible to determine which papers are pro- government 
and which are opposition. 
“Opposition” is understood to be that during the MSZP-SZDSZ and MSZP governments they were right-wing political 
papers, while under the FIDESZ-KDNP government it was left-wing papers.  
 
The proportion of advertisements purchased in opposition papers compared to all political papers 
between 2003 and 2006 was around 20%, while between 2007 and 2009 it increased to 30%. A very 
high value could be observed in the second half of 2010 – probably the advertisement purchases of 
the former MSZP and the new FIDESZ-KDNP governments influenced this short period parallel. 
The proportion fell strongly back in 2011 and the lowest value obtained was in 2012 as presumably 
the FIDESZ-KDNP government stopped the orders of its predecessor (see Figure 8.). 
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Figure 8: Rate of State Advertising in “Non-Government” Print Media, 2003-2012 (%) 
 
Source: calculations by the CRCB (www.crcb.eu) based on data from Kantar Media (www.kantarmedia.com) 
 
The study also pointed out that the examined left-wing oriented newspapers had a much larger 
amount of state advertising revenues between 2003 and 2008 than the right-wing oriented ones. But 
as it had analysed more left-wing oriented newspapers than right-wing ones, it could not draw any 
conclusions based on their data. However, in 2009, a massive decline was started in the advertising 
revenue for left-wing oriented papers; in 2010 and 2011 this decline merely intensified, while the 
increase in advertising revenue for right-wing oriented newspapers only jumped in 2011 (see Figure 
9.). 
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Figure 9: State Advertising Revenue in Left and Right Wing Oriented Print Media (millions 
Ft), 2003-2012 
 
Source: calculations by the CRCB (www.crcb.eu) based on data from Kantar Media (www.kantarmedia.com) 
Notes: the green line represents the right wing oriented print media and the blue line represents the left wing oriented 
print media. 
In 2010 there were general elections held in Hungary when a left-wing government was swept away by the right-wing 
FIDESZ-KDNP coalition. 
 
Additionally, there are some examples when a medium radically changes its political orientation. 
The Magyar Hírlap was in this special situation, as its editorial staff was almost entirely replaced in 
2006127, thereby enabling us to illustrate the politically influenced nature of state advertising orders. 
The vertical lines on Figure 10. indicate the time when the owners and editors changed. It is clearly 
visible that government advertising orders began to decline during the change in ownership and that 
advertising revenue for Magyar Hírlap from government and state enterprises only began to 
increase after the change in government in 2010.  
                                                
127 http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/atalakuloban_a_magyar_hirlap_pres_alatt-66377  
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Figure 10: State Advertising Revenue of Magyar Hírlap (millions Ft), 2003-2012 
 
Source: calculations by the CRCB (www.crcb.eu) based on data from Kantar Media (www.kantarmedia.com) 
Notes: the ownership structure and editorial changes are marked with the vertical lines. 
 
The paper concluded that 
“… the increased advertising revenue from public funds of daily newspapers and weekly 
magazines close to the governing parties is not only of concern for the survival of diverse 
political journalism. The media's role is to explore, and thus discourage corruption. The ability 
to fulfill this role has been carefully limited thanks to political influence on the media.  
In a market in which there is a high concentration on the buyers' side, in our case the 
government, or the purchase of advertising space by a couple of state or private companies has 
a large weight on total advertising revenues, and advertising revenue represents a high 
proportion of total revenue, media players necessarily become dependent on big customers. 
This dependence can impede the free functioning of the media.” 
 
The relationship between the advertisers and the media can seriously affect the work of the 
investigative journalists. The concentrated ownership structure of the media has some influence 
here as well. Some of the interviewed journalists drew our attention to the fact that as a publishing 
house typically has several news outlets, even if only one of its subsidiary publications publishes an 
article violating the interests of advertisers or potential advertisers, then the advertising revenues of 
the other news outlets owned by the same publisher may also be affected: 
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“All of the newsroom would support investigative journalism. But, e.g. PUBLISHING 
COMPANY1 is a prosperous company, they would have the necessary money for investigative 
activities, but they say they would rather support these activities somewhere else; they do not 
want to get involved in investigation, because advertisers would disappear from NEWSPAPER5 
and NEWSPAPER6 papers (the two leading/most read tabloid newspapers in Hungary). Thus 
the publisher would suffer in an indirect way. Every newsroom would like to investigate, 
because there is demand for it, but the owners simply do not want that”. 
 
The case of István Kocsis is a characteristic example illustrating the influence that a public 
advertiser has on the media, but we heard several additional examples from the interviewed 
journalists and media experts. For instance, following the change of government in 2002, when a 
high-ranking politician involved to a certain case of corruption, asked the journalists of an emerging 
online portal not to write about it, the editorial office was simultaneously threatened by a significant 
public company with the termination of their advertising contract if they refused to cease their 
coverage of that scandal128. The editor-in-chief of that medium chose to cease coverage of case, 
however, the actors of the scandal discontinued their corruption activity. 
The interviewees also gave us several examples when advertisers or supporters of journalism were 
affected by the politics. For instance, Vodafone, PwC and Gedeon Richter Plc.129 supported the 
Prize for Quality Journalism130 between 1997-2013, but when an article dealing with a company 
with strong political influences was rewarded, the prize was terminated: 
“But the same happened to the Prize for Quality Journalism: JOURNALIST5 wrote a series of 
articles about COMPANY4 (a Hungarian construction company), and as far as I know the then 
CEO of COMPANY4 called everybody from PWC to Vodafone on the phone instructing them to 
stop sponsoring the award. It happened around 2012-2013. JOURNALIST5 sued COMPANY4 
because of the article written about them. The award is given to recipients by a foundation with 
Vodafone, Richter Gedeon (pharmaceutical company) and PWC as sponsors, and with several 
prominent journalists in the board of curators (Balázs Weyer, Dorottya Vízi, Endre B. Bojár, 
Antónia Mészáros). Not long after the publication of those articles, the award was cancelled 
abruptly; they simply stopped giving the award to journalists. These outstanding companies 
squeezed a monthly 220,000 forints, annually 2.4 million forints (774 euros/per month) out of 
their pockets.” 
 
Another interviewee almost word by word said the same: 
“(…) in the end COMPANY4 started to nag the sponsors of the Prize for Quality Journalism, so 
that is why the award ceased to exist. They wore out jury members and sponsors; they visited 
them in person, and there was one sponsor who had business relations with COMPANY4 – it 
was purely an ignoble pressure put on them.” 
 
Additionally, when some companies entered into strategic agreements with the government, their 
sponsorship or decisions affecting the media related to them suddenly changed, for example in the 
                                                
128 There is the Lazar’s case with Origo.hu newsportal. Janos Lazar had been the Secretary of State of the Prime 
Minister’s Office between 2012-2014, and then State Minister of the new Fidesz government. About the case see: 
http://bit.ly/1PnCt8Z and http://bit.ly/1TLCKz2 . 
129 A leading Hungarian pharmaceutical company. 
130 Minőségi Újságírásért-díj (http://www.minosegiujsagiras.hu) 
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case of mobile operators. Perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of this phenomenon was the  
removal of Gergő Sáling, the editor-in-chief of Origo a leading Hungarian news portal in 2014. He 
was presumably removed from his position because of the pressure of the government on the owner 
of Origo, Hungarian Telekom (a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom) as a consequence of articles131 
dealing with some suspiciously high hotel bills of János Lázár. 
As it was mentioned earlier, it is common that several media outlets are concentrated at one 
publishing house, even television channels, radio broadcasts, online and print newspapers132. The 
editors and the journalists working in such conditions have to consider not only the advertising 
revenues but several other potential sources of conflicts of interests. For example, if an article 
publishes a scandal in connection with a cable television service provider in an online news outlet 
of a given publisher, then if it has television channels, they may become banned on network of the 
affected cable television service provider. 
In addition, there are certain business people who have interests in several influential media outlets 
(see Table 3.). For example, one of the most influential media business people is Lajos Simicska 
with extensive interests in television, radio and print media, and additionally via the websites of 
these media outlets, in the online scene too. He went to the same high school as Viktor Orbán. 
Simicska and Orbán then attended the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the Eötvös Loránd 
University in Budapest, where they were roommates in the dormitory of a special residence hall for 
law students, called the Bibó István College133. In 1993, Lajos Simicska became the financial 
director of FIDESZ, and between 1998 and 1999 he served as the president of the Tax and Financial 
Control Administration134. After he resigned from that position, he built a large business empire 
including companies with diverse activities (mainly construction, advertising and media). The 
relationship between Lajos Simicska and Viktor Orbán had gone wrong between 2014 and 2015, 
probably partly because of a new tax on advertising revenue adopted in the summer of 2014. The 
conflict became public when Lajos Simicska used a rather offensive four-letter word 135  in 
connection with Viktor Orban in the interviews he gave after the editors-in-chief of Hír TV, 
Lánchíd Rádió, and Magyar Nemzet suddenly resigned for “reasons of conscience” on the 6th of 
February in 2015136.  
Another important Hungarian businessman with notable media interests is Zoltán Spéder, to whom 
several important online portals are linked to through the Central European Media & Publishing 
                                                
131See: http://bit.ly/TRWMQy  
132 For example Mediaworks publishes 54 different media outlets (http://mediaworks.hu/en/products). 
133See: http://bit.ly/28Tldc5 
134 Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal (APEH) 
135 See: http://bit.ly/25zrUUs and http://valasz.hu/publi/balszezon-109485 
136  http://mno.hu/belfold/kozlemeny-1271611. See the article about this breakup in the Economist: 
http://econ.st/1y5dvvW . 
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Corporation. He became the vice-president of OTP Bank, the most significant Hungarian bank, at 
the age of 31 and recently he works on the integration of saving cooperatives. Spéder has several 
interests in Hungarian banks and serious media interests. He has the support of several leaders of 
FIDESZ for his projects, but the possession of index.hu, a portal that often criticizes the Orbán-
government, makes his situation special137. 
 
Table 3. The media portfolio (properties) of some significant Hungarian entrepreneurs, 2015 
  Television Radio Print Online 
Lajos Simicska Hír TV 
Class FM Heti Válasz 
  Lánchíd Rádió Magyar Nemzet 
Music FM  Metropol 
Zoltán Spéder 
 
Inforádió  IngatlanInfó  
Dívány 
 Femina 
 Index 
 Napi 
 Női Friss 
 Pénzcentrum 
 Port 
 Portfolio 
 Retikül 
 Totalcar 
 Travelo 
  Velvet 
Gábor Széles Echo TV   Magyar Hírlap   
Sources: http://bit.ly/28Tl60v ; http://bit.ly/28XuC2W; http://cemp.hu/  
Notes: The online portals of the televisions, radios and print media outlets are not listed. 
The media outlets with significant relevance in public or political life are highlighted with bold.  
 
Gábor Széles138 who privatised the Videoton139 in 1991 and became the president of Ikarus140 in 
1996, should be highlighted. In 2005 he founded Echo TV141 and in 2006 he acquired the company 
that publishes Magyar Hírlap. Both of Gábor Széles’s media outlets have rightist leanings, even 
                                                
137 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/speder-nem-hallgat-tovabb-1603277  
138 http://www.szélesgábor.hu/index.php?mod=menu&mid=2  
139 A Hungarian company that developed, manufactured and sold Videoton branded consumer electronics (televisions 
and radios), IT and defence electronics products before the transition in 1989-90. It was the largest Hungarian industrial 
group in local private ownership in 2013. 
140 A Hungarian company that used to have a leading role in the bus industry by producing about two third of the 
articulated buses of the world in the 1970s and the 1980s.  
141 The overrepresentation of the news in connection with the government and the FIDESZ in the news programmes of 
the Echo TV can be detected based on the data of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority 
(http://bit.ly/28TeTlb) 
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though Magyar Hírlap used to be have liberal tendencies. He participated in the organisation and in 
the financial support of Peace March142, a demonstration supporting Viktor Orbán and his 
government143. 
In the light of the traffic statistics for the Hungarian websites, the situation of Zoltán Spéder and his 
company, CEMP, can be considered yet more exceptional. In 2014, nine of his abovementioned 
online portals144 were included in the top 100 list of the most viewed webpages145. Additionally, 
CEMP operates several further webpages represented on this list, for instance blog and forum 
engines, email service, photo or video sharing sites and online games and shops. 
Some journalists claim that in a prudent media market if an investigative journalist finds an 
interesting topic that is being banned by a particular news outlet, then the journalist should find 
another medium which publishes his or her articles, but that is not generally possible in Hungary. 
However, we heard several counterexamples during the interviews. For instance, when a journalist 
of a significant online portal had begun to deal with a case of a company that later became one of 
their key advertisers, he continued publishing the articles in a weekly newspaper based on an 
agreement between the two editors in chief. 
Since 2010 there are some new initiatives on the Hungarian media market which may also affect the 
climate of investigative journalism. Several editors and journalists, fed up with the influence of the 
advertisers and the political relations of the owners of their former workplaces, and founded new 
online portals, including Átlátszó, !!444!!! and Direkt36. As it was described earlier, Átlátszó was 
founded by Tamás Bodoky in 2011, after he had left Index. !!444!!! was started in 2013 by Péter 
Uj, the former editor-in-chief of index.hu and by several journalists who went to !!444!!! from 
Index. Péter Uj wrote the following few words in an essay146, discussing the scandal of the 
Hungarian National Bank and a news portal, about the motivation of the foundation of !!444!!!: 
“…The reason for founding 444 was clear: dozens of journalists of Index deserted after its 
owner reacted to the changing content consumption habits of the political power with 
innovative management methods.” 
 
Direkt36 was established by Gergő Sáling, András Pethő and Balázs Weyer in 2015 after all of 
them had left Origo. 
All of these three portals has some financial connection to the Open Society Foundations147, and on 
this basis, they are often condemned by the right-wing oriented media. The financial backgrounds 
of Átlátszó and Direkt36 are also based on crowdfunding as these news outlets are also supported 
                                                
142 Békemenet in Hungarian. 
143 https://atlatszo.hu/2012/08/01/kis-oligarchatarozo-szeles-gabor/  
144 Dívány, Femina, Index, Napi, Pénzcentrum, Port, Portfolio, Totalcar, Velvet 
145 http://ite.hu/legnezettebb-hazai-weboldalak-rangsora/  
146 http://444.hu/2016/04/26/a-kozpenzjellegu-kozpenz-lopasjellegu-ellopasa-es-mas-trefas-esetek 
147 A foundation established by George Soros (https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org). 
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by their readership via donations – they receive ‘one-percent’ donations as well148. On Direkt36 
there are no banners or advertisements at all. Nearly all of the interviewed journalists emphasized 
the advantages of the financial model of these investigative portals: 
“There is no advertising or political influence behind Direkt36 and Átlátszó, their budget comes 
from tenders and crowdfunding. They enjoy full independence; they do not need to weigh the 
issues. For instance, if they publish an article about COMPANY6, then would the COMPANY7, 
that is in connection with COMPANY6, withdraw their advertising next month or not. They 
would even informally praise the article, they would say how good the article was, but they 
would go to another news site where there are no such articles. 
The advertising market far outweighs investigative activities. A prudent media market could 
well ward it off; if the story is published by several media, then the journalist could change 
employers. The problem arises when the advertisers get more and more dependent upon the 
government, whether it is about the pharmaceutical or the car industry, because they have 
strategic agreements with the government 149 . Advertisers are not independent, either. 
COMPANY2 (an international telecommunication company) immediately put an end to its 
journalism transparency programme, when they signed the strategic agreement with the 
government. There was a series of articles at NEWSPAPER3, JOURNALIST4 might have 
written some articles here, that were supported by COMPANY2 on NEWSPAPER3 online 
(COMPANY2 gave money to NEWSPAPER3 thus sponsoring the content of the column)”. 
 
2. The conditions and methods of investigative journalism 
 
As it was discussed in the previous section, strong political influences can be traced on the 
Hungarian media. A survey conducted in every year since 2012 among journalists by Mérték Media 
Monitor pointed out150 that they have a negative opinion about the situation of the Hungarian press 
freedom (see Figure 11.). This attitude seems to be unchanging in the past four years. 
 
  
                                                
148 The Hungarian Personal Income Tax System has included the possibility for the individuals to designate the one-
percent of their tax to approved non-profit organizations since 1996. 
149 About the negative effects of Strategic Partnership Agreements of the Hungarian Government see the Report of TI 
Hungary: http://transparency.hu/uploads/docs/lobbi2014_web_eng.pdf 
150 See:  http://mertek.eu/sites/default/files/reports/07ujsagirovizsgalat-160404-00-single.pdf  
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Figure 11: The situation of press freedom, evaluated by journalists in Hungary, 2012-2015, 
points 
 
Source: Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely (www.mertek.eu) 
Notes: the journalists could evaluate the situation of press freedom on a ten-grade scale. 
 
The press freedom index151 of the Freedom House indicates that the Hungarian press is partly free 
since 2011 after a free period lasting for 14 years (see Figure 12.). The Freedom House concluded 
in its country report152 for Hungary in 2015 that there is a five-year decline in press freedom. The 
report highlighted that “press freedom deteriorated slightly as the government imposed a new 
advertising tax153 and continued to pressure media owners”. 
  
                                                
151See: http://bit.ly/293EsOy  
152See:  https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/hungary  
153 The law on advertising tax came to force on the 18th July 2014 introducing a new tax rate rising progressively by tax 
brackets. After several amendments of the law on advertising tax until November 2014, there was only one media 
company that became the subject of the highest tax bracket, RTL Hungary. As a response, RTL Hungary submitted a 
complaint to the European Commission in claiming that the ad tax is discriminative and distorts the competition. 
Additionally, the proportion of the political reports in the news programme of RTL Klub started to rise and became 
critical to the government. For more details about the advertising tax, see: http://bit.ly/1q8oGXQ. 
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Figure 12: The Press Freedom Score of Hungary, 1993-2015, points 
 
Source: Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) 
Notes: 0 is the freest and 100 is the least free. 
 
The World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders also indicates a sudden worsening 
of the situation of the Hungarian media between 2010 and 2012154. During these two years 
Hungary’s ranking declined from the 23rd to the 56th place (see Table 4.). Since then Hungary could 
not move forward on the list; its position is the 67th out of 180 in 2016. 
 
Table 4: The ranking of Hungary on the World Press Freedom Index, 2002-2016 
Year Ranking 
2002 24/134 
2003 21/158 
2004 28/157 
2005 12/160 
2006 10/160 
2007 17/163 
2008 23/167 
2009 25/169 
2010 23/172 
2012 56/177 
2013 56/177 
2014 64/179 
2015 65/179 
2016 67/180 
Source: Reporters Without Borders (www.rsf.org) 
 
                                                
154 https://rsf.org/en/taxonomy/term/113  
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Returning to the conclusions of Mérték Média Monitor, it should be highlighted that the vast 
majority of journalists feel that the media is under political pressure; they claim that "politics 
controls the media more" is rather correct than vice versa, "media controls the politics more” in 
describing the situation in Hungary. The allocation of state advertising remained the principal tool 
of political pressure, and the importance of this phenomenon increased in the recent years. The 
indirect pressure of politicians and advertisers through the chief editors or the managers of the news 
outlets on the journalists has also increased. 
An important conclusion of the interviews is that there are basically no investigative teams working 
at Hungarian news outlets: 
Investigative journalism is a part of a lot of media, but of course, not everywhere. For example, 
NEWSPAPER1 does not have any, although it is the third biggest news site in Hungary 
published by PUBLISHING COMPANY2, the biggest publisher in Hungary. Investigative 
journalism might not fit into its corporate culture. At NEWSPAPER7 there is no investigative 
journalism, though they refer to themselves as the most independent medium of all. Corporate 
culture has an important role in this, because if the culture is not supportive, or the corporation 
has no tradition concerning investigative journalism then it will not work. Journalists who 
would have wanted to start investigations left NEWSPAPER8 (one of the most popular 
economic weekly in Hungary).  
 
The only counterexamples are the aforementioned Átlátszó and Direkt36, the two online portals 
established in the last five years and are specially dedicated for investigative journalism: 
“But there is Direkt36 or Átlátszó; they seriously deal with this. There are several media that 
attack different political sides. But Magyar Idők155, for example, will not disclose cases linked to 
the right wing. In some cases, the owner’s sphere of interest is also a determining factor; 
NEWSPAPER3 will not publish cases about company COMPANY2156.” 
 
Also there was an investigative group of two or three journalists at “Élet és Irodalom” in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s but it has been dissolved. 
During the interviews, several reasons of this phenomenon were outlined. Firstly, the news outlets 
would not have sufficient human resources to produce enough content if their journalists would 
elaborate investigative articles instead of working in the newsroom: 
“The work of the investigative journalism is financed in the following way: if there is a story, 
the journalist asks for – let’s say – a month freedom, i.e. for a month they should leave him 
alone. But there is no budget earmarked for investigative journalism, what really counts is the 
human resources. If a trip abroad to check company data or a trip to the countryside to check 
out an estate is needed, it is paid for by the newspaper, but these are only some ten thousand-
forint items (petrol/gas, etc.)” 
 
                                                
155 Literal translation of the title of the newspaper: Hungarian Times. A daily paper launched in 2015 and can be linked 
to the current government. 
156 NEWSPAPER3 and COMPANY2 are owned by the same person. 
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So usually if a journalist has a story, he or she has to work on it in parallel with the news editing 
and cannot spend all of his or her time on it. Partly due to these conditions the journalists usually 
work on the cases individually. Performing the investigations as a team is quite uncommon, but if 
the extent of a given case makes it necessary, the journalists join together, like Zoltán Siposs and 
Tibor Krecz did when they wrote about the Tocsik scandal. If a journalist is faced with a case that 
cannot be elaborated without the help of lawyers or IT experts, usually they can access for such 
external help. 
Secondly the preferences of the readership also set some limits on the scope of investigative work. 
The readers usually prefer short articles that are easy to understand, and what is more, they often 
just read only the leads of the articles. For this reason, some editorial offices do not appreciate the 
investigative journalism. The readership also has some influence on the topics as journalists mostly 
deal with stories that they consider to be interesting for the public. The interviewed journalists 
highlighted the inverse relationship between the extent and complexity of corruption and the 
interest of the public: 
“The amount of money does not matter at all. People do not care whether it is 10, 20, 30, or 
100 billion forints (or 300-600 million euros) at stake. Though triviality, the pettiness is 
interesting; the version 1.0 fraud, it is considered to be too much. If corruption is covert, or 
conducted via multiple corporations, or there is an offshore case, it can hardly trigger any 
emotions, people simply do not understand it. They understand a petty a fraud of 250,000 
forints (about 800 euros), but they are helpless in the case of a fraud of several billion forints. 
People got tired, apathetic; corruption is not a sexy topic. Though family ties could hype it.” 
 
“It happens quite often that a colleague finds a really interesting and well-documented 
corruption case (e.g. COMPANY1), but among those concerned there are no prominent or well-
known figures. This article was published in the end as an acknowledgement of the journalists’ 
efforts, but no one thinks that readers would take it all in, especially if the case is too complex. 
For the public well-known names are extremely important. NEWSPAPER2, as an economic 
weekly, positions itself with its sophisticated content. The case of the MNB foundations is an 
intricate one, while whether a politician asked for an invoice in a restaurant or did not is more 
tangible, it is a simple case. Orbán’s choo-choo train157 is smoothly digested, but where and 
when offshore companies are involved, e.g. the privatisation of MKB, the case is no longer 
easily comprehensible because of its complexity. But NEWSPAPER2 deals with complicated 
cases, they do consider the societal impacts of these cases (how big the amount is, e.g.).” 
 
“At NEWSPAPER4 investigative activity/reporting is fully backed, and it means that I have the 
freedom to decide what I want to deal with. Our owner is not a major figure in the Hungarian 
economic field, he has only a stake in a business. He always checks the front page, but in the 
past 4-5 years there has never been any consideration about the contents. There are 
newsrooms/media where the investigative journalism has no prestige at all; it is believed to be a 
superfluous content; they think that the reader solely reads the leads. The stimulus threshold 
has got too high; nobody is able to get absorbed in the details.” 
 
                                                
157 Viktor Orbán supported the construction of the train that runs between the two villages of his childhood and the 
stadium of the football team, the team is also supported by Orban. The investment was financed by EU funds. See: 
http://bit.ly/1WGkDR1 and http://bit.ly/28XuoJc. 
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In conclusion, the fundamental characteristics of a case that would trigger attention are the 
following: 
• at least one well-known person is involved, 
• the affected amount of money is easily comprehensible, 
• the method of corruption is not too complicated (for example performance fee is 
understandable but offshore businesses are not), 
• it affects the everyday life of people, 
• has political affiliations. 
 
The case of István Papp is a good example for a scandal that did not generate much interest, and as 
a consequence, the journalists did not elaborate it thoroughly. 
Additionally, the potential consequences of the investigative work can restrain journalists from 
engaging themselves to the investigative journalism. Éva Vajda, a prominent investigative journalist 
in Hungary said in one of her interviews158 that: 
“…often there is no consequence of the cases revealed by journalists, that frustrates them, 
however, arresting the "hero" of an article on the day after it was published is not a condition 
for a good investigative work. Therefore, that investigative journalism is often not effective from 
such aspects, is not due to the journalist or the quality of their articles, but because of the 
environment surrounding them; the way how other subsystems of society – the Parliament, the 
investigating authorities, public agencies, the whole judiciary system – do their jobs. Although, 
there are positive examples […]. So there is a hope that in parallel with the strengthening of 
civil society, the effects of investigative articles will also increase and they will entail 
consequences.” 
 
Journalists usually develop their own methods by themselves. They have quite diverse educational 
background. Most of them come from the field of humanities, economic, political or social sciences 
but there are many other, more extreme examples159. There is no institutionalized background for 
the education of investigative journalism in Hungary, only some conferences and workshops are 
organized on ad-hoc basis. 
The interviewees mostly agreed that they have to remain independent from their sources, mainly 
from politicians and high-ranking officials, although there are some dubious stories about corrupted 
journalists: 
“JOURNALIST1 has no connections; he may have met three politicians, but he has never met 
anyone from the police or the Intelligence. Though there are journalists who regularly meet 
their informants. He feels very upset when a journalist refers to János Lázár (the Minister 
heading the Prime Minister’s Office, from Fidesz) as “Jani”, or speaks about Antal Rogan (the 
                                                
158 http://k-monitor.hu/eszkoztar/szakertok/oknyomozo-ujsagiras  
159 For example, Krisztina Ferenczi, a memorable Hungarian investigative journalist, who dead in 2015, started her 
journalistic career at about the age of 40. Previously she used to be an actress. 
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leader of Fidesz parliamentary group) as “Toni”, because it presupposes a nexus between the 
journalist and his informant that is not acceptable/permissible.” 
 
“I cannot tolerate if a journalist and a politician hug each other when they meet, even if they 
are relatives, because a journalist should not behave like this in a public place. There are 
stories about certain Hungarian journalists who take part in the election campaign using a 
pseudonym or anonymously. In the Municipal Assembly there is a payroll for journalists in 
certain media who get money for publishing given articles.” 
 
“Everybody knows somebody whose grandmother’s sister has already seen the payroll of the 
press of the Municipal Assembly.” 
 
“It may well be only an urban legend; nobody has ever seen any documentations about this.” 
 
The recent developments of investigative journalism, like data-driven journalism are emerging 
much slower in Hungary than in the USA or Western-Europe. The journalists have to investigate 
what kind of data is available in connection with their story and then they have to get, clean and 
analyse it themselves. Attila Bátorfy, a Hungarian expert of data-journalism160 wrote an overview161 
about the situation of this new trend in Hungary, and he emphasized that: 
“(…) the Guardian, The New York Times, the Washington Post; the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the 
Bloomberg, the Spanish El Confidential, Argentina's La Nación or Swiss public radio (SRF) 
have a separate division working as a data-journalism and visualization team, but we know 
about Slovenian, Romanian, Slovak, Polish, Bulgarian and Estonian editorial offices with data-
journalists too – not just to talk about the Western European media market. Besides them, there 
are freelancers who are involved in various small or even monumental projects. They are 
working in the biggest newspapers, often for months on occasional basis. This type of work is 
also completely unfamiliar on the Hungarian media market.” 
 
The quality and the reliability of the Hungarian data sources were also mentioned as a problem 
facing data-driven journalism in Hungary during our interviews. The journalists and media experts 
highlighted that as more and more articles aim to reveal corruption based on official public data, the 
accessibility and the trustworthiness of these data sources are being reduced. Also only a small 
proportion of the Hungarian readership is able to understand infographics and other interpretations 
of data. 
 
3. The influences of organized crime and intelligence agencies on the uncovering of 
corruption cases 
 
The cases presented in the first chapter of this study have a recurring peculiarity as the information 
leaked by the intelligence agencies or interest groups had key role in their release. Based on the 
                                                
160 He is one of the founders of Databánya, a Facebook-page dealing with resources of data-driven journalsm 
(https://www.facebook.com/databanya/). 
161 http://bit.ly/1XkK5MF  
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interviews we can conclude that the press is a tool for different groups with conflicting interests that 
may leak information about the others’ suspicious affairs: 
“At NEWSPAPER3 the editors decided on what should be covered, they followed their own 
rules and ideas, they did not have any set methods at hand. Journalists basically were tipped-off 
about an issue when a certain interest group gained too much at the expense of another interest 
group in a given case.” 
 
“The Schmitt Pál story162 unfolded as someone just popped into the newsroom, but in this case 
with the material/documentations in his hand. 
(…) 
From time to time certain Secret Service documents tend to appear unexpectedly in the 
newsroom as if these papers were blown in through the open windows by the wind. Then the 
journalist starts working on them in the most thoroughgoing way. For instance, NEWSPAPER 6 
portal, where information is leaked by the Ministry of Interior, information mostly about 
politicians in opposition. We should deal with the information under close scrutiny. We should 
see through them; we should try to find out what the intention might be behind the information. 
Journalists started to move from anonym sources toward data, but this is still very tricky or 
dangerous.” 
 
“There are more and more unknown informants, therefore it is checked when files and 
packages are mailed to the medium. It is also getting more and more widespread that somebody 
creates an email address and starts writing about a case in an extremely detailed way with 
ostensible accuracy. I never use them. There is a guy, it is not exactly known who he is, but he 
regularly provides extremely detailed materials about P1 party. He must have a lot of time, 
because he browses through different information systems in a fairly precise and efficient way. 
There is some temptation to use these pieces of information, but I never do this, although these 
appear in other media sources (NEWSPAPER 1 or NEWSPAPER 2 publish them).” 
 
For instance, in 2005, Aranka Mayer leaked a document package during her divorce to Élet és 
Irodalom about some real estate corruption in the Tokaj-Hegyalja wine region163 of her ex-husband 
in which Viktor Orbán and his wife was involved too. In such cases, the sources of information 
often remain unknown as they send documents and information packages to the editorial offices or 
journalists anonymously. A prominent investigative journalist came to the following conclusion 
during our interview with him: 
“…As the network of the Kádár regime survived the transition, it constantly manipulates the 
newer systems [of organized crime]. The treasurer of a political party had invited some 
journalists once and he showed that he has information about all concurrent party’s financial 
background. The Eclipse-scandal was also leaked because someone had too much income in 
this network. When the Tocsik-scandal had been revealed, clues were found to several bigger 
corruption cases, but the members of the network did not want to leak sufficient information 
about them. The Quaestor-case164 proved that this network is still unshakable.” 
 
                                                
162 Pál Schmitt, President of Hungary, August 6 2010 – April 2 2012. In 2012 he was accused of plagiarism that caused 
a great scandal. HVG, a weekly magazine, disclosed information about his doctoral dissertation that almost wholly is 
the work of other authors’ texts translated word by word into Hungarian. After this he shortly announced his resignation. 
See:  
https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schmitt_P%C3%A1l 
163 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tokaj_wine_region  
164 The Quaestor brokerage firm was filed for bankruptcy in the spring of 2015. See http://bit.ly/1O6MHKF and 
http://bit.ly/1TLVe2C  
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The interviewees told us that investigative journalists sometimes discover information about 
corruption before the police or other authorities do: 
“It happens that a journalist discovers information instead of other authorities, e.g. 
JOURNALIST1 working on the CASE1 was always well ahead of the police. He wrote the 
article and the police was forced to take steps. JOURNALIST 2 had a story like this, as well. It 
also happens that the journalist’s work generates official report of the case and police 
investigation is started. But it is another issue how the prosecutor’s office and the court handle 
the case, where it gets stuck years later. 
 
Partly these conditions imply that investigative journalists are sometimes threatened in Hungary. In 
the 1990s, there were more serious methods of threating, robberies (for instance, as it was 
mentioned in the first chapter, in the case of Tocsik-scandal, the editorial office of Figyelő was 
cracked), grenade blasts165, etc. One of our interviewees said that “a person with children was not 
recommended to become investigative journalist in that decade”. 
Since then the most frequent methods of threatening are following and verbal threats. However, 
very rarely more serious things happen, for instance, threats based on video footages of the 
journalist’s personal life. 
“I have heard and known about this. But I cannot tell you anything else, because I promised 
someone not to speak about it to anyone.” 
 
“But that much I can tell you. I know about a guy who was working on a corruption case and 
his apartment was installed with surveillance cameras somehow. Later they showed the 
journalist the recording, he was blackmailed and he was even observed/followed by them.” 
 
“I have never encountered physical threats, only verbal ones. The white-collar guys who are 
concerned in the case would rather threat you with litigation. That was the greatest pressure, 
the strongest threat of all. It is rather frequent that the article hurts some business interest. Then 
they raise the question: ‘How are going to pay 100 million forints in punitive damages?’ But 
presumably nothing will happen. In connection with one of the cases I met three bulky 
musclemen with golden chains in their necks who leaning over me looked at what I was writing, 
or put their hands on my hand or on my shoulder while I was writing. You can interpret it as a 
friendly gesture, or as some kind of a dominance, but you could also think that these are just 
their own specific personality meta-communicational features. But the threat of litigation is the 
typical one.” 
 
“In connection with CASE5 I heard about threats going beyond legal procedures. The 
journalist working on the case was called by one of the people concerned in the case. An 
entrepreneur (a real big player entrepreneur), the owner of two night clubs (the two biggest 
outdoor hangouts in Budapest at that time) was considered to be ‘a real hard and infamous 
mafia guy’. He was taking personal care of POLITICIAN14 (one of the leaders of the socialist 
party) who was the leader of the investment company in this case. BUSINESSMAN13 invited the 
journalist to a meeting where he ÷ in a very lengthy, realistic way ÷ described how pigs are to 
be slaughtered. Of course, nothing was mentioned about the investment, pig slaughter, alone 
was in the focus. The journalist got the message, there was no need for any further hints, and he 
gave up working on the case immediately.” 
                                                
165 For example the car of Krisztina Ferenczi was exploded next to the mine of the father of Viktor Orbán in Gánt, when 
she was investigating the circumstances of how did the Orbán family become wealthy 
(http://www.168ora.hu/itthon/ferenczi-krisztina-konyv-orban-csalad-124473.html) 
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Additionally, even if the journalists have proof of their statements, actions for libel are brought 
against them. We faced with this fear in many interviews: 
“The owner has never instructed me with whom I should conduct interviews, or what I should 
write about. I suppose editors, among themselves, do discuss what topics could be hot, and it is 
OK, since an editor could well be much more farsighted than a journalist. But it never 
happened that I had a topic and they would tell me that it was too sensitive and I had better not 
deal with it. Once an article of mine remained in the drawer at NEWSPAPER1, because we 
were unable to support something with data and documentations. Half a year later the case was 
revealed and editors were kind of upset. They thought we could have written the article, but 
while writing the article a legal notice by a lawyer was sent to the office stating should we write 
about the case we will be prosecuted. The informants (sources) did not allow us to use their 
names, we did not have any documentations, so we gave up on it. Though the case was known 
by everyone in the business.” 
 
These lawsuits can be very long and exhaustive and therefore can prevent journalists to deal with a 
given case. the investigation documents from the investigative authorities. Also the journalists may 
be afraid that the court sides with the plaintiffs as the judges only receive 
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Lessons from the analysis 
 
 
 
 
The media and the journalists play key role in revealing the corruption scandals in Hungary, even 
though strong political influences can be traced on the Hungarian press and several international 
and domestic organizations drew attention to the worsening situation of the press freedom. This is 
largely because of the weakness of the state institutions that may be evidenced by the length of the 
lawsuits followed the cases discussed in the first chapter. If Hungarian journalists would not carry 
out their important mission of investigating such cases, presumably the number of the legal actions 
launched because of corruption would be far less. As fresh initiatives regarding the 
institutionalization and professionalization of investigative journalism appeared in the Hungarian 
media in the last few years, further reinforcement of this role can be expected. 
The influence on the outbreak of scandals of the organized crime and intelligence services is 
generally known, but not explored in depth so far166. Besides their role in leaking information to the 
media about certain cases, they also have appropriate tools to prevent the journalists from 
elaborating some scandals. However, mostly accusations of libel are mentioned as threats and in 
addition, more serious threats are quite rare. 
The influence on the Hungarian media of some business groups and advertisers is also notable. A 
large part of the Hungarian media is owned by a few entrepreneurs with strong political affiliations, 
and that may affect the work of these editorial offices. Also, the news outlets often depend on their 
public and private advertisers. These relations are not conducive to free and unbiased journalism. 
  
                                                
166One Hungarian political analyst, János Széky highlights the lack of lustration after the transition in 1989-90 as one of 
major political problem in his recent book about the political history in Hungary after 1990 (János Széky: Bárányvakság 
– Hogyan lett ilyen Magyarország? Kalligram. Budapest. 2015. [Sheep blindness. How Hungary got that way?]. He 
presents several examples when corruption was obviously revealed by members of secret services on purpose of 
compromising their opponents, for instance the case of UD Zrt. (pp. 230), Ivánné Kivágó and György Hunvald (pp. 
216). There was only one deep analysis about sensitive state security documents of Kádár’s regime written by a 
working group lead by a prominent Hungarian historian, Janos Kenedi in 2008 
(http://mek.oszk.hu/08400/08450/08450.pdf). 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
A1. List of abbreviations 
 
Table A1.1. List of abbreviations used in the study 
Abbreviation Name in English Name in Hungarian 
BKV Budapest Transport Company Budapesti Közlekedési Vállalat Zrt. 
CEMP Central European Media & Publishing  
CRCB Corruption Research Center Budapest Korrupciókutató Központ Budapest 
GVH Hungarian Competition Authority Gazdasági Versenyhivatal 
HLI Hungarian Labour Inspectorate Országos Munkavédelmi és Munkaügyi Főfelügyelőség 
HSP Hungarian Socialist Party Magyar Szocialista Párt 
LMP Politics Can Be Different Lehet Más a Politika 
MOL Hungarian Oil & Gas Company Plc Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Részvénytársaság 
MVM Hungarian Electricity Private Limited Company Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt. 
NBH Hungarian Special Service for National Security Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal 
NPAM National Privatization and Asset Management Corporation Állami Privatizációs és Vagyonkezelő Rt. 
OTP National Savings Bank Országos Takarékpénztár 
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A2. The details of the interviews 
 
The Hungarian research team interviewed eight leading investigative journalists and one 
media expert. Six of the interviewed journalists won the Gőbölyös Soma Prize167, an award 
dedicated to young investigative journalists in Hungary. This prize was awarded eighteen times 
since its foundation in 2002 (see Table A2.1.): therefore about the one-third of the prize winners 
were interviewed. Four of the interviewees won the Prize for Quality Journalism (the background of 
this award was discussed in the section about market structure and the influence of advertisements), 
some of them were awarded for several times. Also an interviewed journalist received the 
Hungarian Joseph Pulitzer Memorial Prize168. 
 
Table A2.1. List winners of Göbölyös Soma prize, 2002-2015 
Year Journalist Topic / Case revealed 
2002 Gábor Blénessy The corruption of an organization dealing an agricultural innovation 
2002 Attila Rajnai Oil bleaching 
2003 Zoltán Haszán Public spending for the organization of public holidays and for building Hungary's image 
2004 Attila Mong Brokerage scandal 
2005 Zoltán Bogád A doubtful IT procurement 
2006 István Szabó M. The cases of the Hungarian Railways Company 
2007 Éva Vajda The internal affairs of Hungarian Telekom 
2008 András Bódis The corruption case of János Kóka, the former Hungarian minister of economy 
2009 Gergely Brückner The corruption case of Siemens 
2009 András Pethő Series of public orders won by a company for billions without tendering 
2010 Péter Magyari The Russian influence on the gas market of Hungary 
2011 András Szabó The sale of the building of the Hungarian commercial office in Moscow 
2011 Anita Vorák Corruption at a Hungarian public television channel 
2012 Zoltán Dénes A loan of 13 billion HUF that was never repaid 
2012 András Pethő The rise of a construction company belonging to Lajos Simicska 
2014 Leonárd Máriás Relation between the winners on the tobacco-shop tenders and a tobacco-wholesaler 
2014 Babett Oroszi The public spending of film support 
2015 Bálint Szalai Frauds in connection with Hungarian citizenship 
Source: https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gőbölyös_Soma-d%C3%ADj#D.C3.ADjazottak  
  
                                                
167 http://www.gsoma.hu  
168 An award founded by Pál Fábry, a Hungarian businessman living in New Orleans, in 1989, with the aim of 
honouring the outstanding achievements of Hungarian journalists after the transition of 1989-90 (www.pulitzer.hu). 
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A3. Index of people who were mentioned in the study 
 
Table A3.1. Index of people who were mentioned in the study 
Name Brief introduction 
András Bánó Presenter and news editor of Objektív, a news show, during the outbreak of the Tocsik case. 
András Szász A consultant of István Kocsis who was involved in some of the offshore companies affected in the Kocsis case. 
András Pethő Founder of Direkt36; previously he worked for Origo. 
Aranka Mayer She leaked a document package about some real estate corruption linked to the family of Viktor Orbán. 
Attila Bátorfy A Hungarian expert of data journalism. 
Balázs Weyer Founder of Direkt36; previously he worked for Origo. 
Endre Deák One of the founders of Eclipse Informatikai Rendszerház ZRt. 
Éva Vajda A prominent investigative journalist in Hungary. 
Ferenc Gyurcsány Prime Minister of Hungary between 2004 and 2009. 
Ferenc Hevesi Tóth 
A former leader of the Hungarian Special Service for National Security; joint owner in 
Eclipse Asset Managmenet Ltd. with Endre Deák. 
Gábor Széles An important Hungarian businessman with notable media interests. 
Gergely Dudás A journalist who worked on the Kocsis case at Index. 
Gergő Sáling Founder of Direkt36; previously he was the editor-in-chief of Origo. 
György Budai An entrepreneur who was associated with the Alliance of Free Democrats during the activity of Márta Tocsik. 
György Eiselt The director of one of the two bureaus at the Interior Ministry, who bought overvalued services from Eclipse. 
György Szilvásy Deputy Secretary of State during the second Gyurcsány government. 
Gyula Horn Prime Minister of Hungary between 1994 and 1998. 
Hajnalka Pintér Project manager at Eclipse; daughter of Sándor Pintér. 
Imre Szokai President of NPAM during the activity of Márta Tocsik. 
Imre Mártha The successor of István Kocsis as a CEO at MVM. 
Imre Katzenbach An employee of Eclipse who took 500 million forints from the account of the company. 
István Nikolics Leader of the Hungarian intelligence agencies during the outbreak of the Tocsik case. 
István Kocsis He led the MVM between 2004 and 2008; during the Tocsik scandal he was a director of NPAM. 
István Papp The former president of the HLI. 
István Ignácz The director of one of the two bureaus at the Interior Ministry, who bought overvalued services from Eclipse. 
Iván Pető Member of the Alliance of Free Democrats. 
János Lázár The Secretary of State of the Prime Minister’s Office between 2012-2014, and then State Minister of the new Fidesz government. 
Krisztina Ferenczi A prominent investigative journalist in Hungary. 
Lajos Simicska 
He built a large business empire including companies with diverse activities (mainly 
construction, advertising and media); he was a roommate of Viktor Orbán in the 
dormitory. 
László Boldvai Treasurer of the HSP during the activity of Márta Tocsik. 
László Hagymási One of the founders of Eclipse Informatikai Rendszerház ZRt. 
Márta Tocsik A lawyer, who was involved in the formalization of contracts of NPAM; she was a scapegoat in a complex and iconic case of political corruption. 
Péter Lovas Manager of Vektor Ltd., a company specialized in counselling services for local governments, during the activity of Márta Tocsik. 
Péter Liszkai Counsellor of NPAM during the activity of Márta Tocsik. 
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Table A3.1. Index of people who were mentioned in the study (continued) 
 
Name Brief introduction 
   
Péter Uj Founder of !!444!!! news portal; previously he was the editor-in-chief of index.hu news portal 
Sándor Csányi Chairman and chief executive officer of OTP Bank Group; he is the wealthiest person in Hungary, and Hungary's first billionaire according to the Forbes. 
Sándor Pintér Minister of the Interior during the Orbán governments. 
Tamás Deutsch Member of FIDESZ; he drew attention to the Tocsik case in the Hungarian Parliament. 
Tamás Suchmann The minister responsible for matters of privatization during the activity of Márta Tocsik. 
Tamás Lovas Director of Vektor Ltd.  
Tamás Bodoky The journalist who revealed the Kocsis case on Index.hu; founder of Átlátszó.hu 
Tibor Krecz One of the journalists who revealed the Tocsik case in Figyelő. 
Zoltán Siposs One of the journalists who revealed the Tocsik case in Figyelő. 
Zoltán Cseke Head of legal and audit department of the HLI. 
Zoltán Spéder An important Hungarian businessman with notable media interests. 
Zsolt Hernádi Chairman and chief executive officer of MOL Group. See: https://mol.hu/en/  
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A4. Interview guideline 
 
1. Introduction 
a. When did you become a journalist? 
b. Where and in what positions did you work in the media? 
c. Which cases did you reveal? 
d. Which professional awards have you received? 
2. Choice of topics 
a. To what extent is the responsibility of the editors and journalists? And of the 
owners and the management? 
b. Have you experienced that a topic was refused or forced by the editors, the 
management or the ownership? 
c. How important are political topics? 
d. Which characteristics make a case interesting? And which characteristics make 
them boring? 
3. Conditions, financing 
a. Is investigative work considered to be important in the editorial offices? To what 
extent? How do they support it? 
b. Are there investigative teams in the editorial offices you have experience with? 
c. How are the investigative articles carried out? 
d. How can you describe the financial conditions of investigative journalism? 
4. Contacts 
a. What kind of relations are there between the journalists and the possible actors of 
corruption? 
i. Politicians? 
ii. Police? 
iii. Prosecutor’s Office? 
iv. Entrepreneurs? 
b. Who makes contact, the actors or the journalists? 
c. How important are these contacts? 
d. Are there international relations? 
5. The characteristics of investigative work 
a. What are the characteristics of investigative journalism compared to general 
journalism? 
b. Is it individual or team work? 
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c. What are the stage of processing a case? 
i. How much time is required for the different stages? 
d. How often does it happen that investigative journalists discover corruption instead 
of the police or other authorities? 
e. How often does it happen that investigative journalists become corrupted? 
f. What are the main difficulties during investigative work? 
g. What is the role of data, the data-driven journalism? 
h. Have you ever had some kind of failure during investigative work? What 
happened? 
6. Threats 
a. Have you heard about any threats against investigative journalists? 
b. What are the typical ways of threatening? 
c. Do the threats become realized? 
d. What do the journalists do when they become threatened? 
7. Consequences of investigative journalism 
a. How do the editorial offices reward the investigative journalism? 
b. How do professional journalistic organizations reward the investigative jobs? 
c. What political consequences caused by investigative journalism? 
8. Specific cases 
a. What do you know and think about the media coverage of the following cases? 
i. Papp István case 
ii. Eclipse case 
iii. Kocsis case 
iv. Hagyó case 
v. Zuschlag case 
vi. Hunvald case 
vii. Tocsik case 
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